



The politics of Bihar after Independence from 1947 to 1977

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Abstract

Empowerment is condition of loving power, and being able to exercise it and obtain the benefits thereof. The Indian way of Securing empowerment for un-empowered is to Provide Quota of community casts and Gender. There are six (6) resources viz economic, social, political International, moral and physical that led to empowerment of Weaker Sections.

After independence, the objective of the state has been to move local government in the direction of democracy. The ideal was formally enshrined in the constitution (article 40). But the path from feudal type to the democratic type has occasionally led to anomie and fragmentation, as in Bihar, where local government lies paralysed in the midst of vicious caste wars.

The complex nexus of the national, the regional, and local has been possible through a number of national legal and political initiatives, and has been more successful in those parts in India where a competitive party system has successfully integrated the local with the national. By extension of the same argument, the experimentation in local democracy has been the least successful in those regions where no autonomous empowerment of subaltern groups has taken place.

The politics of Bihar maybe divided into two phase. In the first phase, which extends up to the 1967, it is principally a story of the use of political power by the upper castes to retain their social domination. The second phase that began from 1967 is marked by the rise of upper backward caste people as major contenders of state power and forceful protest movements of the marginalized Schedule Castes (SCs) and neglected Scheduled Tribes (STs).

Keywords: politics, loving power, SCs, STs

Introduction

- To lead the empowerment of weaker sections.
- Securing empowerment for un-empowered to provide upto of community casts and Gender.
- The economic social, political, internationals, moral and physical.
- The Local Government in the direction of democracy.
- To Autonomous empowerment of subaltern groups.
- The State power and force protest movements of the marginal = casts (scs) and neglected treble (STS)

Objectives of the Study

The basic objectives of the study are

- To study the Politics of Bihar towards an understanding.
- To find out the story of the use of political power by the upper castes to retains their social domination.
- To Find out that The began from 1967 is marked by the rise of upper back ward casts people as a major contenders of the state power.

- To study the combination of three Mr. K. B. Sahay, Chief Minister, Sushil Kumar Bage a Scheduled tribe MLA as the right ward Rama Lakhani Singh Yadav as my left hand was the significant is Traditional of Bihar politics. The combination of Three made by the Government extremely un popular.
- During the traditional period the Bihar Politics was articulated with term of Backward virus Upper Casts.
- To observe the backward class movement led by Karpoori Thakur as the Organization of the poor in the double assault on the cast system and class structure.
- To analyze of the 1995 Assembly elections Laloo Prasad Yadav was subbing with confidence.
- To Identify the Tactful alliance of the Janta Dal United and the Bhartiya Janta Party dissolved the R.S.P. from the Power Assembly Election of 2005.

The Political Development of Bihar has been divided into Eight Phases as Shown is the Table below

Table 1: Political Development of Bihar

Phase	Period	Party	Chief Minister
1. First	1947-1961	Congress	Shri Krishna Sinha
2. Second	1961-1971	Congress	Jagannath Mishra
	1961-1962	Do	B. N. Jha
	1963-1967	Do	K. B. Sahay
	1967-1969	Three coalition ministries of Opposition parties	Mahamaya P. Sinha S. P. Singh B. P. Mandal
	1969-1971	One Ministry backed by Congress which was in power for four days Five coalition ministries In two of which mainstream Congress, i.e. Congress (R) was partner	B. P. Shastri Harihar Singh B. P. Singh

			Daroga Raik Karpoori Thakur B. P. Shastri
3. Third	1947-1977 1972-1973 1973-1975 1975-1977 1977-1979	Congress Do Do Do Janta	Kedar Pandey Abdul Ghafoor Jagannath Mishra Karpoori Thakur
4. Fourth			
5. Fifth	1980-1990 1980-1983 1983-1985 1985-1990	Congress Do Do Do	Jagannath Mishra Chandrashekhar Singh Bindeshwari Dubey Bagwat Jhar Azad Jagannath Mishra
6. Sixth	1990-2005 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005	Janta Dal supported by some non- Congress parties Janta Dal Rashtriya Janta Dal (RJD) RJD Supported by Congress and other minor parties Janta Dal United JD (U) + Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) Janta Dal United JD (U)	Laloo Prasad Yadav Laloo Prasad Yadav Rabri Devi Nitish Kumar Nitish Kumar
7. Seventh	2005 to 2013	Janta Dal United JD (U)	Nitish Kumar
8. Eight	2013 to till now	Janta Dal United JD (U)	Nitish Kumar

The Congress party retained absolute control over government uninterruptedly from 1947 to 1967. The same leadership of the nationalist movement guided the destiny of the caste-ridden, semi-feudal and impoverished state for two decades. The Congress provided stable government and it has made no significant contribution to development. The Congress ministry headed by the veteran Shri Krishna Sinha came to power in Bihar in 1946. Shri Sinha continued as Chief Minister until his death in 1961. There is a general consensus that the period of 1947 to 1961 is the brightest in Bihar’s post-independence policy, because the government was stable and effective under the mature leadership of Shri Krishna Sinha. However, facts do not substantiate this assessment. The nationalist movement leaders were conservative and biased towards the upper castes and the landed gentry, so little could be expected from them. In policies nothing that would disturb the status quo could be expected from them.

The second point is this that they were themselves involved in narrow inter-caste conflict.

The third point is this they were themselves status quo at heart and they sought to build their support base through mobilization of people of their fellow caste and by co-opting other twice born castes.

In the tradition society of Bihar, it is only the caste idiom that worked in politics. Hence, the caste structure became increasingly politicized, leading to intense inter caste conflicts. The pre-independent Congress forged a link with the zamindars and landed gentry. “It is this class bias of the Bihar Congress that delayed zamindari abolition and prevented the government from introducing even a modicum of land reforms.”

Remaining within the same party and government, the heavy-weight Rajput leader, A. N. Sinha, was constantly at

loggerheads with the Bhumihar Chief Minister Shri Krishna Sinha until his death. The leadership struggle did not confine itself only to the top. It percolated down to all levels. These inter-and intra-caste rivalry among the Congress leadership, which was the exclusive domain of the upper-caste, became more intense after the death of Sinha in 1961. B. N. Jha, a Brahmin, K. B. Sahay, a Kayastha and M. P. Sinha, a Bhumihar, fought among themselves for the leadership. “Each drew support from a few caste-based factions, but none of them was tall enough to mobilize wide support cutting [across] the intra-party factions’. This was the beginning of the period of unstable governments and growing crisis in the governability.”²

Until the death of Shri Krishna Sinha in 1961, the Congress party was the dominant party in the country and Bihar as well. The opposition was weak and the social domination of the upper castes was matched by their total control over the political system. Leaders of the nationalist movement were veterans, which provided enviable political capital to the party. The Congress had its organizational network from the national to the district level. The patronage system linked the local leaders of the upper castes with the organizational network of the party. There was discipline within the party and the top leaders could resolve conflict at the lower levels either by writ or persuasion and conciliation. Simultaneously the lower level organization had some political space. Of course, there were factions and conflict between the Bhumihar Shri Krishna Sinha and the Rajput A. N. Sinha within the cabinet were well known. Similar cleavages were present throughout the party. Yet, everybody maintained a semblance of discipline and even A. N. Sinha, after losing the leadership battle in the 1957 election, did not attempt to break the party. At the socio-economic level there was not much turmoil and the supremacy of the upper castes

remained almost unchallenged. The government did not face any crisis up to the early 1960s. There was stability and political institutions were functioning smoothly. "The party worked as the cohesive unit and democratic norms were observed, even though this democracy was restricted only to the upper caste and class. As a result despite tension underneath there was a kind of political equilibrium at the surface."^[3]

Gandhian desires for the dismantling of the colonial bureaucratic structure, the transformation of the Indian National Congress into an organization for constructive work in the countryside, and the creation of a decentralized form of government based on the revival and reorganization of traditional forms of local self-government (the panchayats) down to the village level were not taken seriously by the Constituent Assembly of India. Moreover, the entire system of British district administration, which both concentrated authority at the district level and provided for very little participation by representatives of the people, was retained virtually intact, particularly the central importance of the District Magistrate and the district courts and the police.

In the period for 1962 to 1967 the first chink surfaced in the armour of the Congress party. There are three important reasons for the emerging tensions in the Congress party.

The first reason is that the upper caste Congress leadership was finding difficult to monopolise state power due to the rising aspirations of the backward castes in his cabinet by limiting the number of ministerial position for the upper castes. K. B. Sahay who became Chief Minister in 1963 in his public speech referring to "Sushil Kumar Bage, a Scheduled Tribe MLA as a 'my right hand' and to Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav as 'my left hand' was significant in traditional Bihar politics."⁴

The second reason is that due to the dependence of Sahay on political concessions to various factions, he was unable to stop the abuse of power by faction leaders occupying ministerial position. Last but not the least the draught of 1965 and 1966 brought the state to the brink of a famine.

The combination of the three made the government extremely unpopular.

The state government was unable to check the tide of extreme unpopularity, which was expressed through strikes, demonstration, and *bandhs*, the government resorted to the use of force, which culminated in police firing in the month of August 1966. The assembly elections were held in 1967 and the Congress party for the first time found itself dislodged from power. None of the opposition parties of the state was in the position to form a government on its own strength. This result could be marked as the emergence of coalition politics based on narrow political gains of various factions. "The period between 1967 and 1972 was the 'transition phase' of Bihar politics and the state had nine Chief Minister's three separate spells of President Rule and one midterm election. The state politics witnessed some new features during the 'transition phase'. The presence of the backward castes was felt in the legislature and the government. In the ticket distribution for the 1967 assembly elections the Congress party that was earlier almost monopolized by the upper castes had to make major concessions for backward castes. Thus, it is not a coincidence that out of nine governments formed during the transition period seven governments were led by man of the backward of *Harijan* castes"^[5].

During the transition period the Bihar politics was articulated in terms of backward versus upper castes. The Congress party was split into two in 1969. Various Prominent Congress leaders of Bihar joined the new Congress led by Indira Gandhi. The new phenomenon of rigged elections emerged in the midst of extremely unstable politics. Hence forth, booth-capturing and other forms of rigging became a normal feature of Bihar election.

Conclusion

It is crystal that the ruling congress government did not do anything to either strengthen the institution with greater devolution of power and resources, or for extending democracy to the lower castes and classes through active participation in panchayats. The compulsion of the Gandhian principle forced the ruling Congress party to establish and sustain the PRIs. But the caste, class and the political strategy of the ruling Congress party to retain state power with the help of landed gentry and dominant caste and class prevented the ruling party from taking any radical step to deepen local democracy. In short as long as the strategy worked without creating any problem of governance the PRIs were allowed to exist. As noted earlier, the situation took a turn after the death of Shri Krishna Sinha. The factional rivalry increased considerably within the Congress Party, which led to organizational disintegration in the state. During the transition period the presence of the upper backward castes presence was felt. K. B. Sahay who became Chief Minister in 1963 was found making concessions to the backwards whose voice had been practically strangled in the previous period. The internal among the backward casts for greater political power, demands of the upper backwards among the backward castes for greater political power, growing discontent of the have-nots in the village, and the extra ordinary food crisis of the 1965 and 1966, resulted against the stability of the Sahay government and completely destabilized the political equilibrium of the previous Chief Minister Shri Krishna Sinha era.

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