



The cashew nut sector of Côte d'Ivoire: Regulation and stabilization of stakeholder interests

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Abstract

Since the Ivorian socio-political crises (the crisis of 2002 and the post-election crisis of 2010), the cashew nut sector, which is one of the economic opportunities of the far north of Ivory Coast, has been dysfunctional in the application of the rules and regulations. Commercial standards of raw cashew nuts. The goal for us is to understand and explain how the rules, standards and prices ordered by the new regulations of 2013 and modified in 2014 contribute to stabilize the interests of actors in the cashew nut sector. The investigative techniques mobilized are the bibliographic review, the direct observation, the semi-directive interview guide, the individual interview, the counting of articles and the listening of recorded media. The results showed that the increase and the respect of the purchase price of raw nuts, the establishment of the Cotton and Cashew Council (CCA), the implementation of the new regulation and its progressive respect constitute among others, factors that gradually recompose the cashew nut sector.

Keywords: sector, regulation, actors, stabilization

Introduction

Absent from the Central, North and West (CNO) zones since the socio-political crisis of 2002, the State signed, from 2007, and the Ouagadougou agreements which provided for the restoration and reinforcement of the State Authority over the entire region Ivorian territory. The subsequent redeployment of the State did not influence the installations of the Forces News (FN), which particularly managed the cashew sector through the CSCA (Cotton and Cashew Monitoring Committee) which was set up in 2005. This structure still defied the rules and marketing standards for raw cashew nuts put in place by the state until it was dissolved in 2012 by the new political authorities. It should be added that, during this socio-political crisis of 2002, in addition to CSCA, several categories of unidentified actors were involved in the industry by circumventing the rules and commercial norms. Thus, in 2013, a new regulation setting the rules for the marketing of cashew nuts and regulating the activities of the sector was set up by the Ivorian State. It is therefore a question of describing and analyzing the regulatory framework of the activities of the cashew nut sector, then showing how the new regulation of 2013, which was modified in 2014, contributes to stabilize the logics of interest of the actors exercising in the sector. Said die. This amounts to an account of both informal and legislative mechanisms from a phenomenological point of view by their description as a concrete reality (Bénoist and Karsenti, 2005 quoted by Babo, 2011) ^[6, 5]. In order to carry out this study, it is important to specify that we have taken into account the notes and documents internal to the administration, the speeches and positions taken by certain leaders of the sector, the draft laws, the decrees, ordinances, official reports, etc. In addition to the literature, we had to conduct interviews with actors in the sector. All of these data collected made it possible to elucidate the contribution of the new regulation of the sector on the interests of the actors but also to mention some irregularities.

Regulatory framework for the activities of the cashew nut sector from 2013

The regulation is the set of indications, laws, prescriptions, rules, and other legal texts governing a social activity. In the context of the cashew nut sector, it is the regulation, subjecting all actors to the regulation established by the authority and which lays down the rules relating to the marketing of cashew and the regulation of the activities of this sector. The purpose of this regulation is to respond to the need for a complete and objective source of information on the fundamental aspects of the cashew nut sector, in particular those of the marketing channel for cashew products. This need, which the various actors were waiting for, was intended to lay solid foundations for the marketing of raw nuts, since the urgency of a regulation that puts an end to price volatility in reference to the games of interest between the different actors became important.

This new regulation involves a regulatory process, involving various activities of interacting actors to establish and maintain a given outcome in the pipeline. Moreover, we know that any regulation implies a regulatory structure which implies a regulatory content. This regulation therefore covers specific topics in the cashew nut sector, including framing, sacking, the internal and external marketing of nuts, the local processing of nuts, research and the organization of actors.

Regulatory process for the activities of the sector

Long before describing the process itself, it seems important to stress that the cotton and cashew nut sectors are, according to Mamadou Sangafowa Coulibaly, Minister of Agriculture, the main drivers of the economic and social development of the North, Central and East the Ivory Coast. Moreover, Akindès (1997) ^[1] argues that agricultural development responds more adequately to the immediate socio-economic needs of the population. It is therefore in the sense of consolidating the gains that adequate solutions

to the constraints faced by actors in these sectors that the State has decided to initiate the institutional and operational reform of these two sectors. To this end, the Minister of Agriculture initiated discussions in consultation with the main actors and partners in the cotton and cashew nut sectors, the technical ministries concerned and the State's technical and financial partners. It is therefore during a long process that the State has managed to put in place a collection of applicable texts and a document of operability which constitute the guides of the cashew industry since 2013.

In this study, we are interested in the collection of applicable texts and particularly in the regulation of the activities of the cashew nut sector. In this basic text, we find organic texts, decrees, orders or ordinances that sometimes mention the two sectors (cotton and cashew).

Collection of texts applicable to the cashew nut sector in 2013 and amended in 2014

On this point, we have relied on some specific points of the basic text, but also, organic texts, the regulation of the activities of cotton and cashew nuts and other texts related to the cashew nut sector. The regulation is preceded by a basic text and organic texts

- **The basic text**

The basic text is " Law N° 2013-656 of 13 September 2013 laying down the rules relating to the marketing of cotton and cashew and regulating the activities of the cotton and cashew nut sectors ". This basic text of 2013 was updated in 2014.

- **Organic texts**

The different organic texts are composed of decrees which are:

- Decree N° 2013-681 of 02 October 2013 on the name of the body responsible for regulating the monitoring and development of activities in the cotton and cashew nut sectors;
- Decree N° 2013-720 of 23 October 2013 appointing members of the Board of Directors of the Cotton and Cashew Council;
- Decree N° 2013-721 of 23 October 2013 appointing the Director General of the Cotton and Cashew Council;
- Decree N° 2014-199 of April 16, 2014 ratifying the election of the Board of Directors of the Council for Regulation, Monitoring and Development of the Cotton and Cashew Nuts activities, known as the "Cotton and Cashew Council".

Following the organic texts consisting of decrees, we have the regulation which consists of several decrees and a decree.

- **Regulation of the different activities of the sector**

The regulation of the various activities of the cashew nut sector consists of decrees, a decree and other texts related to the cotton and cashew nut sectors:

- **Decrees**

- Decree N° 2013-808 of 26 November 2013 laying down the procedures for collecting taxes and fees for the Cotton and Cashew Council and for professional dues in the cotton and cashew nut sectors;

- Decree N° 2013-809 of 26 November 2013 laying down the procedures for the internal marketing of cashew nuts;
- Decree N° 2013-810 of 26 November 2013 laying down the procedures for the external marketing of cashew products;
- Decree N° 2013-811 of 26 November 2013 laying down the conditions for practicing the profession of buyer of raw cashew nuts;
- Decree N° 2013-812 of 26 November 2013 regulating the profession of exporter of cashew products;
- Decree N° 2013-813 of 26 November 2013 on sacking for packaging raw cashew nuts;
- Decree N° 2013-814 of 26 November 2013 laying down the conditions for the exercise of the profession of third-party owners in respect of cotton and cashew nuts.

- **Stopped**

The inter-ministerial decree N° 072 / MINAGRI / MPMEF / MPMB of March 03, 2014 fixing the levels of levies and professional dues collected on the cashew nut sector for the 2014 campaign.

- **Other texts related to the cotton and cashew branches**

The other texts relating to the cotton and cashew nut sectors consist of an order and an order as follows:

- **Order**

Ordinance No.2011-473 of 21 December 2011 on Agricultural Interprofessional Organizations.

- **Stopped**

Interministerial Order N° 294 / MINAGRI / MIRAH / MPMEF / MI / MCAPPME of August 20, 2013 setting the conditions of creation, recognition and operating procedures of the Interprofessional Agricultural Organizations.

Stabilization factors for the logic of interest from 2013

From 2002 to 2012, the domestic marketing system had many shortcomings, including the lack of information from producers and co-operatives about the quality, weight, price of raw cashew nut, and prices of almonds at the same time. Moment of sales negotiations, but also, the lack of a marketing platform between producers and buyers. This situation resulted in the deterioration of quality and high price volatility among the players.


As regards the setting of the purchase price on the edge of the cashew nut market in Ivory Coast, it was based on the principle of an indicative price determined by a price mechanism agreed upon by the operators. The purchase price of the raw nut was decided between the different professional families on the basis of a cost matrix, which was based on the price offered by buyers in dollars to arrive at a residual price after deduction of all the costs of approach. In practice, the cashew selling price at the local level depended on the period. The indicative prices derived from the fixing mechanism were very often above the prices offered to producers. The price differences observed varied from one to two depending on the season.

During the whole period of crisis, new players appeared in the sector and, since 2013, there has been a new restructuring of this cashew sector. Some actors who intervened during the crisis period disappeared thanks to the

introduction of the new regulation.


Mappings of actors in the domestic cashew marketing system before and after 2013

Figure 1 shows the different players in the raw nut marketing system before 2013 and Figure 2 shows the different actors involved since 2013 in the marketing of raw cashew nuts.



Source: Author

Fig 1: Structure of the marketing system for raw nuts from 2002 to 2012



Source: Author

Fig 2: Actors of the domestic marketing system of cashew nuts from 2013

In this diagram 2, we have 4 groups of actors involved in the marketing circuit of raw nuts. Scheme 1, above, presents 7 groups of actors who intervened in the circuit before the new reform. In Figure 1, there are 4 management structures that have intervened in the chain concomitantly or successively. Figure 2 presents only the CCA which is the only structure (representing the State) that manages the sector.

In this scheme 2, a group of actors is practicing illegally. These are producers who have become trackers or buyers of raw cashew nuts. Indeed, this group of actors is located in the villages. They buy the nuts with their fellow producers before and after the launch of the campaign and then resell them later on the rise.

In sum, as can be seen in Figure 2, several players have disappeared from the arena of the cashew nuts market.

Key axes recomposing the cashew nut sector of Ivory Coast

Several key axes recompose the cashew nut sector of Ivory Coast. Under these axes, it concerns:

• **Supervision in the cashew sector**

The process of supervising cashew farmers is based on the contractualization of the producers' management activities. It is in this sense that a tripartite agreement has been signed between ANADER, FIRCA and CCA for the supervision of producers; hence, the dedicated agricultural council. Since 2014, this coaching process is underway. In this process,

farmers are taught how to "grow" cashew nuts, how to harvest cashews, how to sell production, and so on.

According to Mr. KONÉ (Study Officer of the Deputy Director General of the CCA), one hundred thousand producers were trained as part of this management process (statement made in January 2016 at the time of our survey). He also added that in 2017, the CCA provided for the supervision of more than 250,000 producers. It is important to note that producers are trained at all levels, from production to marketing. The objective of the dedicated framework is to improve the productivity of cashew nuts and to strengthen the capacity of FOs. In this context, it will be:

- Train producers on Good Agricultural Practices (GAP);
- Help strengthen the organization, management capacity and performance of existing takeover bids and consolidate other types of takeover bids.

• **Sacking in the cashew industry**

The production and export of raw cashew nuts continues to grow steadily throughout the seasons. Côte d'Ivoire grew in 2015, the world's leading producer and leading exporter of raw nuts with 702510 tons and 650000 tons, respectively. Despite these performances, the quality of national production is very often described as bad, because of inadequate harvest and post-harvest conditions. For the preservation of raw nuts, jute bags are recommended. However, unlike the coffee-cocoa sector, there was no organization responsible for the distribution of the bagging

in the sector.

To remedy this situation, one of the major strategic axes of the reform of the sector adopted by the Government is the establishment of a sacking specific to the cashew nut sector. Thus, a bagging management mechanism has been put in place, drawing on the experience of other sectors, particularly the coffee-cocoa sector. This new device will allow all producers to access a quality bag that is adapted to the product's requirements and to improve the storage conditions and marketability of the product. This should substantially improve the income of the various producers.

• The marketing of cashew nuts

The internal marketing system for cashew nuts in Ivory Coast has many shortcomings as already discussed above. There is also the lack of a marketing platform between producers and buyers. This situation results in a deterioration of quality, but above all, a very high price volatility between the players (ARECA, 2013b) [3].

Take the particular case of the target price determined by a price mechanism agreed by the operators; it was always or almost above the prices offered to producers. It is in light of these factors that the government took the initiative to reform the cashew sector from 2013. Thus, new provisions on domestic trade and a new mechanism for setting the purchase price of cashew nuts have been put in place, guaranteeing a mandatory minimum price for producers.

Before 2013, we spoke of indicative floor price. Today, the mandatory floor price is a minimum price, but it is not a guaranteed price. For the moment, we are not yet at the guaranteed price stage. We have floor prices. The floor price indicates, for example, that the buyer can pay the raw nuts at 300 FCFA and over, but not below 300 FCFA. Prices are not guaranteed as there is no cashew bursary yet. (KONE G., Registration, 19/12/2016)

In the domestic trade circuit, most buyers are identified and licensed. All those who are licensed have transaction documents that are:

• The contribution book produced, duly pre-printed by the Board

The logbook is mandatory between the buyer and the producer. This book is kept by the buyer. Normally, it should be held by the producer but 79% of the producers are illiterate (Gnénon, 2018) [11], which authorizes the buyer to keep this book.

• The transfer sheet

The transfer card allows the buyer to transport his product from his store to the exporter or processor. Today, no

product can leave any area to go to the port without the transfer slip that indicates the amount of nuts, the purchase price, and even the identity of the producer who sold the product. The transfer card also makes it possible to check whether the buyer has respected the purchase price to the producer, because this price is marked on the card.

At the level of the exporter or the mill, there is also a process that is engaged. In this process, the truck is weighed in the presence of a service provider designated by the body. In the case where the moisture content does not meet the standard, the buyer must dry his product. The quality analysis is also done in the presence of the buyer and a service provider designated by the body. Despite this control, which should appear strict, the quality of Ivorian nuts dropped in 2015. The structures and rules govern the official functioning of an organization, but they leave areas of uncertainty that individuals or groups will try to control in the future. Pursuing their own strategies. According to Mr. KONE:

In 2014, the quality of the Ivorian nuts was good. In 2015, quality fell. This is because those who measure quality have not been serious about their work. Some actors go beyond the rules. If, for example, someone takes his production from Korhogo to the port of Abidjan for marketing and is told that the humidity is above 10% and he must return with his product to do so to dry, he prefers to corrupt the person who measures the quality rather than to execute. For example, instead of losing 2,000,000 FCFA, he can offer 500,000 FCFA to the person who will pass the product. When this product arrives outside, it is said that it is not good. This is what happened in 2015 "(KONE G., Registration, 19/12/2016).

We note that at this level of control, there is still uncertainty about the integrity of the people and the reliability of the organization which, according to Mr. KONÉ, should find a solution for the 2017 campaign and for other upcoming campaigns.

• Local processing of cashew

Since 2015, production-level performance (see table below) has made Ivory Coast one of the world's largest producers and the world's largest exporter of cashew nuts. However, the Ivorian cashew sector is characterized by a massive export of raw nuts and a total dependence on the outside because of a very low rate of local processing. In 2015, for a total production of 702510 tons of raw nuts, Ivorian mills processed only 40 000 tons, or just 5.69% of national production.

Table 1 : Quantities of production of cashews from 2001 to 2015

Years	Production (ton)	Evolution (%)
2001	87573	
2002	104984	19,88
2003	84830	-19,19
2004	167000	96,86
2005	185000	10,78
2006	235000	27,02
2007	280000	19,14
2008	330000	17,85
2009	350000	6,06

2010	380000	8,57
2011	400000	5,26
2012	450000	12,5
2013	500000	11,11
2014	564780	12,95
2015	702510	16,10

Source: Author / ARECA (2013c) / Archives CCA / Ivorian Customs / ACE

The observation of the table shows that cashew production had dropped considerably in 2003 with a percentage of -19.19% compared to the year 2002. This production boomed in 2004 with a production rate of 96.86%. Since then, production of Ivorian cashews has been growing steadily, but this production is largely exported to foreign countries for further processing. This cashew production has grown from 84,830 tons to more than 702510 tons, making Ivory Coast the world's largest producer of raw cashew nuts. At the institutional level, the cashew processing process faces some major difficulties, according to ARECA (2013c)^[4], which are:

- The high cost of carrying out environmental impact studies;
- Lack of strategy and transformation model to promote;
- The low level of organization of the actors;
- Labor legislation (remuneration of workers at the SMIG).

These problems, which have been observed since 2013, still persist in 2015, because in the reform foreseen in the 2013 operational document, it was planned to implement a policy aiming at a conversion rate of 35% by 2015 and by 100% of production by 2020. The observation shows that at the end of 2015, the conversion rate did not reach 6% of production. However, new cashew processing units are being built by national and international investors (ARECA, 2013c)^[4]. The growing interest of these investors in the transformation requires significant state support measures, including the encouragement of public and private partnerships. It is important for the country to move from being an exclusive supplier of raw materials to being an exporter of almonds and cashew products by 2020 as foreseen in the Operational Document.

• **Research in the cashew sector**

In Ivory Coast, cashew production is the result of many small-scale farmers with small holdings (1-3 ha) scattered over an area planted with more than 750 000 ha (ARECA, 2013a)^[2]. The original purpose of the cashew plantations was to fight against the advance of the desert. No coordinated action had been undertaken to put in place an adequate research mechanism. As with varieties, cultural practices were not part of a truly coordinated effort of national structures.

Today, the overall objective of the research sector is to improve, with respect for the environment and at the best cost, the productivity of cashew and the quality of nuts and cashew apples in order to contribute to the increase of the income of the different actors. We note that several research aspects have already been addressed under the authority of ARECA. We can mention among others:

- the enrichment of the Lataha collection;
- the agromorphological and technological characterization of the trees in the collection;
- the selection of high-performance clones resistant to

water stress and adapted to different agro-climatic zones;

- varietal creation

According to the Study Officer of the Deputy Director General of the CCA :

"As soon as it was set up, the Cotton and Cashew Council signed, in the continuity of ARECA, a tripartite agreement between FIRCA, CNRA and ANADER to continue and continue the research program of the State (varietal research program). Next to the research, there will be the implementation of the health map that will be done with the University Felix Houphouet-Boigny. This map will help identify any health threats in the orchard. In the context of this map, it is a question of fighting diseases of the orchard according to the region. The purpose of this map is to identify all the diseases and insects that destroy the orchard. It is also a question of locating all the diseases of the orchard in each region or of mapping each disease related to the orchard. The result with the CNRA is that we have 3 plans (3 genotypes) that are in diffusion. Today, if you want to create a plantation, you have the choice between 3 types of plans that are improved plans with a large production. In the face of aging plans, the research proposes grafting. The experiment has already been done from the Madinani station. These 3 plans are high-yield plans. The work continues so that we have a day of seed to put at the disposal of producers. Today, several producers know the technical itinerary (KONE, Registration, 19/12/2016). Le développement de la filière anacarde repose sur des programmes de recherche axés sur des objectifs identifiés par les acteurs eux-mêmes. Cela demande l'implication des interprofessions dans la conception des études et dans leur exécution. L'atteinte des objectifs de ces programmes de recherche passe par la mise en œuvre de contrat-résultats qui soient suivis et évalués pour garantir aussi bien l'exécution que le financement.

• **The organization of the actors**

Like certain agricultural sectors, the cashew nut sector is dysfunctional at the level of its Professional Agricultural Organization (OPA), as well as at its level of representativeness (ARECA, 2013c)^[4].

Among the problems of this disorganization are:

- The problem of identifying producers;
- non-compliance with so-called indicative prices;
- The establishment of the Inter profession which did not give it a representativeness;
- The lack of supervision of producers.

In addition, some NGOs such as INADES, RONGEAD, GIZ provided support to producers. Since 2013, several measures have been taken as part of the reorganization of the cashew nut sector. We can mention among others:

- the identification of the actors of the marketing chain

through the issue of approval;

- the introduction of standardized marketing documents, namely the product purchase book and the transfer form;
- The systematic control of the humidity level at the port stores;
- The prohibition of illegal exit of products by land;
- The introduction of a sacking specific to the cashew nut sector.

All these measures are aimed at respecting the price floor and improving the quality of the Ivorian cashew nut.

• **The price formation process from 2013**

As a general rule, the fixing of an on-farm price is done on the basis of a mechanism which takes into account the price of the raw material on the international market, from which are deducted the charges borne by the various parties involved in the process. Marketing. According to the provisions of the reform, a price equal to at least 60% of the CIF price must be guaranteed to producers. What are the determinants of the purchase price of cashew?

• **Determination of the purchase price of cashew**

In the process of price formation, there are interests. Thus, the recomposition is defined here by the stability of the interests of the actors of the sector which gives to everyone what he expects. It is therefore a search for a compromise between interests in order to stabilize the sector.

Moreover, price determination is a function of the destinations and the quality of the Ivorian nuts. The main destinations of the cashew nuts of Ivory Coast are India, Vietnam and Brazil. Depending on the quality of the exported products, CIF prices are offered. Three (03) steps are used to determine a consensual cashew purchase price:

- **Step 1:** Implementation of the information system by the Board for the appreciation of the CIF price on the main destinations of cashew nuts (India, Brazil, and Vietnam). For this, the following sources of information were used:
 - Expert analysis bulletins;
 - Chambers of Commerce of cashew nut importing countries;
 - The economic services of Ivorian embassies to importing countries.
- In the medium term, the body should have representation in the main cashew nut importing countries in order to have a more efficient information system to assess the evolution of the CIF price.
- **Step 2 (January):** Negotiation with traders to agree on the CIF reference price and the price structure.
- **Step 3 (February):** Adoption by the Government of the proposed price structure and start of the marketing year.

• **Setting the guaranteed minimum purchase price**

The guaranteed minimum price for producers is set twice during the campaign throughout the national territory. A price on the first two months (March and April) of marketing and another over the rest of the period to take into account the evolution of the market. However, at the

invitation of the Board, operators will be required to revise the price in the event of a price variation of +/- 20% at any period of the marketing year. This price will be at least equal to 60% of the CIF price whatever the level of the international market.

• **Stabilization and price support mechanism**

• **Principles**

The principle aims at mitigating the drastic variation of the price which can affect the producer, thus the durability of the sector. In times of rising prices, the operation will consist in curbing an automatic price surge. A portion of the price obtained on the international market will be deducted to constitute a reserve. In times of falling prices on the international market, the mechanism will support the price at 60% of the CIF price to the producer. Due to the volatility of the market, the change in moving averages of field prices over the last four years will be useful in determining the risks to be covered by the Support Fund.

Critical view on some key articles of the rules relating to the marketing of cashew nuts and the regulation of the activities of the sector

The analysis will highlight some of the factors that have contributed to the gradual elimination of disorder in the cashew value chain in general, and in particular in the marketing of raw cashew nuts.

- **Critical view of Article 4 of Decree N° 2005-23 of 27 January 2005 (former regulations) and Article 5 of Law N° 2013-656 of 13 September 2013 (new regulations) laying down the rules relating to marketing of the cashew nut and the regulation of the activities of the sector**

On the one hand, Article 4 of Decree N° 2005-23 of 27 January 2005 stipulates that: "The cashew nut is bought from the producer at a free-at-frontier reference price negotiated freely and fixed by agreement within the inter profession of the sector ". The implementation of this article has contributed to the disorganization of the sector, in particular to the disruption of the cashew marketing system, since the purchase price could be negotiated between the buyer and the producer. Its application allowed all buyers to negotiate the purchase price edge field in their favor. This is how the producers of " Brown Gold " have become " price takers ".

On the other hand, Article 5 of Law N° 2013-656 of 13 September 2013 stipulates that: "Cotton and cashew products are purchased from producers at a minimum floor price determined on the basis of a mechanism. Resulting from an, inter professional agreement within the sector. This minimum price is validated and guaranteed by the body responsible for regulating the activities of the cotton and cashew nut sectors. Contrary to Article 4 of Decree N° 2005-23 of 27 January 2005, Article 5 of Law N° 2013-656 of 13 September 2013 was complied with during the first two (2) years (covered by our survey) of the implementation of its application. The respect of this law seems to have contributed since 2014 to the respect of the purchase price edge fixed field, as well indicates the following table:

Table 2: Official field price (FCFA / kg) and field price charged FCFA / kg

Year	Price on the official field (FCFA / kg)	Price edge field practiced FCFA / kg
2002		110-200
2003		85-500
2004		75-175
2005	150	200
2006	150	180
2007	170	150
2008	200	170
2009	150	165
2010	170	204
2011	300	275
2012	310	225
2013	200	175
2014	225	300
2015	275	410

Source : Cotton and Cashew Council

The table shows that over twelve years, from 2002 to 2013, it was only over four (4) years (2005, 2006, 2009 and 2010) that the field price was in favor of cashew farmers. The other years, they were simple price takers. But since 2014, the date of implementation of the new regulations, the purchase price field edge fixed is respected in a general way as the law stipulates it. We have seen in the field that the field price is actually a minimum price at which nuts are purchased. From this date, the price set is a mandatory floor price. This system now allows village planters to benefit from remunerative and incentive prices. It thus protects the village planters from the vagaries of price fluctuations on the international market of cashew kernels.

Furthermore, it is noted that Article 4 derives from Decree N° 2005-23 of 27 January 2005 and Article 5 of Law N° 2013-656 of 13 September 2013. The fact that Article 4 comes from a decree does not necessarily explain the non-compliance with the purchase price edge field between 2002 and 2013. This non-compliance with the purchase price to producers can be attributed to the crisis situation experienced by Côte d'Ivoire between 2002 and 2011.

- **Critical view on Article 2 of Decree N° 2005-23 of 27 January 2005 and on Article 5 of Law N° 2013-656 of 13 September 2013 laying down the rules relating to the marketing of cashew nuts and to the regulation of activities of the sector**

Article 2 of Decree N° 2005-23 of 27 January 2005 stipulates that: "The marketing campaign for cashews is open to any legal or natural person identified by the provisions in force". This article is unclear because it leaves an opening for anyone with the financial means to become a buyer of raw cashew nuts. This study found that anyone could buy rough nuts during the crisis period. During this period of crisis, the government zone could not afford to control the rebel zone, which was the largest cashew nut production area. Thus, in the area under the control of the rebels (renamed F.N.), shopkeepers, merchants of all kinds, out-of-school young people who, with a little money, became buyers of raw cashew nuts.

Article 5 of Law N° 2013-656 of 13 September 2013 stipulates that: "Purchases of cotton and cashew products may only be carried out by the following operators:

- natural or legal persons whose main activity is the purchase of cotton or cashew nuts;
- cooperative societies and their unions, federations or

confederations operating in the cotton or cashew nut sectors;

- industrial companies whose object is the processing of cotton or cashew products;
- Commercial companies whose object is to export cotton or cashew products ".

Unlike Article 2 of Decree N° 2005-23 of 27 January 2005, Article 5 of Law N° 2013-656 of 13 September 2013 seems to give more details on the people who are able to buy cashews. The implementation of this article does not allow shopkeepers or any other persons whose main activity is not the purchase of the cashew nut to become a buyer.

- **Disappearance of some management structures in the arena**

At the end of the 2010 post-election crisis, the government decided to reorganize the cashew nut sector. Thus, we have witnessed the disappearance and dissolution of certain management structures in the arena.

- **Disappearance of INTERCAJOU**

In recent years, several dysfunctions have been noted in the general organization of INTERCAJOU, among others:

- The problem of representativeness; Producers were often sidelined when it came to setting the purchase price on the field.

- The problem of legitimacy within the INTERCAJOU; For some years now, an internal crisis was shaking INTERCAJOU. The PCA of the structure was disputed by some members of this structure. The General Assembly had removed him from office in September 2009 and reinstated on March 22, 2010 by court order (Fraternité Matin, March 29, 2010).

- The problem of excessive levy of 25 FCFA / kg as royalties;

Royalties are funds raised by structures recognized by the State through a text. However, no text or law governs the establishment of the INTERCAJOU.

- **The problem of mismanagement.**

According to Tioté Mamadou (president of the producers and processors of the cashew nut), "Toure Abdoulaye and his Council have resigned." There are minutes of the meetings in support. "Toure Abdoulaye admitted taking 35 million CFA francs, which has been left without justification. This money and resigned. According to Tioté

Mamadou (President of the producers and processors of the cashew nut),

"Toure Abdoulaye and his Council have resigned. There are PVs in support. He led a Board of Directors that mismanaged. Toure Abdoulaye admitted taking 35 million FCFA which remained without justification. So, to avoid the fury of the producers, he promised to repay this money and resigned.

The Ministry of Agriculture, having noted these dysfunctions, has therefore decided to put an end to the operation of the INTERCAJOU. Initially, there was talk of the dissolution of the INTERCAJOU, but, in fact, it is not about dissolution as such. According to statements received from the Secretary General of ARECA, INTERCAJOU has not been dissolved:

"The INTERCAJOU has not been dissolved as such. What happened? When the dissolution of INTERCAJOU was filed, the Ministry wrote to us. He told us that there was no text that formalized the creation of INTERCAJOU. So there is no text planned to dissolve it. In fact, when the INTERCAJOU was created, the Minister should take a text to confirm the creation... There were complaints. In Odienné, Konaté Vassiriki complained that there was fraud in Odienné, then the Minister jumped on it to say that there appeared to be problems, so he can not confirm the official creation of the INTERCAJOU. There was no text to confirm. When it was a question of dissolving, where was the text that created it? We dissolve a thing with a text, we create a thing with a text. There was no text therefore, I cannot tell you (...), so in the way he came, it's the same way he left... (Djan, registration of 12 / 09/2013) "

This is how the INTERCAJOU saw its doors closed. The functions it performed were entrusted to ARECA pending the reorganization of the structure, which nevertheless played an important role in the management of the sector. The struggle led by INTERCAJOU to obtain the best prices for cashew nuts and a better living condition of its actors was not enough to keep it running. The structure closed down after having observed numerous dysfunctions and an internal crisis.

Considerable efforts will be needed to set up an interprofessional organization that is truly a place of meeting, listening and dialogue between the different stakeholders of the cashew nut sector Ivory Coast. The following testimony by President Appia attests the willingness of actors to see a dynamic interprofession come into existence:

"I want the government to put in place guidelines to create a true inter professional, legitimate, representative and will be the locomotive of the industry in Côte d'Ivoire. Because without a strong inter profession, there will always be what the bankers call the disorder and there will certainly not be funding in the sector "(Koffi Yao Appia, August 21, 2013).

The College of Producers should include the main leaders of cooperatives active in the service of planters in the different production areas. Only then can it be considered as a

legitimate structure to support the improvement of practices and speak on behalf of planters. The interactions provide an approximate but anticipated state of satisfaction of the guests with the delivery; they help to defuse possible discontent. They are an opportunity for producers to maintain contact with other actors.

Disappearance of the Cotton and Cashew Monitoring Committee (CSCA

Following the 2010 presidential election, which saw the election of President Alassane Ouattara, the CSCA was dissolved in order to allow the uniqueness of the state coffers and allow, at the same time, to unify the country, for sustainable development throughout Ivory Coast.

The combination of interests of the RDR and the Forces Nouvelles facilitated, in a general way, the unification of the country and in particular the deregulation of the CSCA which, it is said, was the centerpiece of the cashew nut sector during the crisis. In fact, he controlled 60% of cashew nut production before it was dissolved. The dissolution of the CSCA made it possible to improve the purchase price of the raw nuts for the benefit of the producers.

Conclusion

The internal cashew trade in Ivory Coast shows dysfunctions, most of which appeared during the socio-political crisis that triggered in September 2002. To correct the persistent dysfunctions Coulibaly (2017) ^[7] and consolidate the gains, the State has initiated the reform of the sector which lays down the rules relating to the marketing of the cashew nut and the regulation of the activities of this sector. These rules are based on a basic text, organic texts, decrees, an order and an order.

Given the current distribution system in which intermediaries, trackers, traders and wholesalers generate significant profit margins at the expense of producers, it is essential to secure the producer in his production activity. But also, to create a climate of trust between the producers and the rest of the marketing chain, thus leading to mutual loyalty and a sincere and lasting partnership. These systems will gradually lead the producers of the sale of their products to a more equitable exchange. Soro (2012) thinks that the transformation of derived products is the best solution for a harmonious development of the cashew nut sector. This opinion must be supported if it is based on rules and standards pre-established and respected by all actors in the value chain

Following the 2002 crisis and the fall in the price of cotton, cashew production has emerged as an innovation that overcomes, at least in part, the new financial constraints and uncertainties that emerged in the aftermath of the crisis. the cashew nut sector. Today, the disappearance of a group of actors, the organization of the producers, the increase and the respect of the purchase price of the raw nuts, the establishment of the CCA, the installation of the new regulation and its progressive respect constitute, among others, factors that gradually recompose the cashew nut sector. Coulibaly (2017) ^[7] talks about a very positive impact on the sector (institutional and organizational framework, qualitative and quantitative results) of the implementation of the reform.

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