

Taking turns: The reversal of domination relations between natives and migrants in the south-west of Côte d'Ivoire

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Abstract

This article is about the development of the balance of power between migrants and natives in the cocoa-growing area located in the southwest of Côte d'Ivoire, in connection with the reversibility in the political field. Based on export agriculture, the Ivorian economic and social model has favoured immigration and enabled many national and non-national migrants to get access to land. This policy has led to the restructuring of living environments which, itself, has influenced social relations. Thus, more or less peaceful during the first decades of the independence of Côte d'Ivoire, the relations between migrants and natives have become tense under the combined effects of the exhaustion of land resources and political changes. If under the regimes of the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (DPCI) and the Ivorian Popular Front (IPF), power relations were more or less in favour of natives, we notice that under Alassane Ouattara, there is a reversal of these relations which places migrants in a position of domination in relation to their hosts.

Keywords: military-political crisis, domination, natives, migrants, Côte d'Ivoire

1. Introduction

In Africa, land was and still remains peoples' main source of income and livelihood. Nearly 70% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa farm, which alone represents 50 to 70% of GDP (Desdoigts and Kouadio, 2012). In Côte d'Ivoire, the population is predominantly agricultural. The agricultural policy adopted by the French colonist and continued by the Ivorian leaders after the independence in 1960, has encouraged the influx of migrants- the bulk of them being voltaic- towards the southern forest to serve as labour (Babo, 2006, Kone, 2006; Tano, 2008) in the plantations. In the Ivorian south-western part, these migrants are employed in the construction and operations of the port of San Pedro, in the industrial plantations of palm oil and rubber, as well as in the lumbering structures (Babo, 2008). Over time, this human mass has converted to cocoa-growing due to the attractive prices and facilities of access to land resources. Besides the foreign contingent, migration also concerns the Baoule people from the center of the country who, taking advantage of the policy of Houphouët Boigny supervision and a favourable economic environment, would progressively and sustainably settle in areas conducive to export agriculture.

However, this migration dynamics has had significant impacts on the demographic and socio-economic level in the reception areas: the increase of human density in cocoa-growing regions (Zanou and Nyankawindemera, 2001) ^[30] and the reconstruction of rural areas. Moreover, the socio-demographic recomposition has been a pillar of the success of Côte d'Ivoire's agricultural policy. Indeed, like in the colonial period, it is assumed that the migrant labour force has contributed to the development of the western forest areas underexploited by natives (Chauveau and Dozon, 1985, 1987) ^[9]. Besides, the massive adhesion of the rural masses to cash crops has very quickly allowed the country to rise to the respective ranks of

world first cocoa producer and world third coffee producer after Brazil and Colombia (Koffi *et al.*, 2012) ^[22].

However, combined with the post-independence policy of opening the Ivorian state, migratory movements have been the starting point of a vast colonization of arable land, which has led to a considerable decrease in forest in less than three decades. The rush of migrants to the southwestern forest areas and their conversion in cocoa-growing have contributed to the narrowness of arable land (Vallat, 1979 ^[29]; Agbroffi 2002; Babo, 2006^[4]) and the saturation of real estate. All this, to the extent that for Babo (2010) ^[4], these migrant populations have permanently settled in this region to exploit vast forests.

Although having been beneficial to the production activity, the massive influx of migrants to these areas have also caused, over time, tensions with indigenous communities. These conflicts have exacerbated with the violent changes in the political field. During late 1999 for example, the death of a young Kroumen following upon an altercation with a Lobi sufficed to trigger violent clashes between Kroumen and Dagari and Lobi in Tabou region in the far south-west of Côte d'Ivoire. These clashes caused several casualties and the expulsion of more than 20,000 Burkinabe from the region. This example is symptomatic of the explosive situation of conflict in the relations between natives and migrants regarding land issues.

The readings on violence around land are various. For Chauveau (1990, 1993) ^[10, 11], in addition to real estate saturation, conflicts between migrants and indigenous populations in forest areas derive from the differentiated interpretation of the 1998 real estate law or conflicts between customary and modern rules about access to land. Indeed, in October 1970, the Ivorian State - through the declaration of Houphouët Boigny during the fifth congress of DPCI-ADR-acknowledged that every Ivorian- may he be in origin or by adoption, has the right to permanently enjoy and transmit to his

heirs, a plot of land he exploits. This statement turned into a political slogan (*the land belongs to whoever exploits it*) in the 70^s helped the migrants to get access to real estate ownership under the reign of Houphouët Boigny. For a long time it was around this slogan and generally by tacit agreements between the parties that the acquisition of property rights was structured. This was done apart from the pre-eminence of the ancestral ties with the land or membership of an ethno-linguistic group (Babo, 2010) ^[4]. This mode of access to land has favoured the massive colonization of land by national and non-national migrants. It was also for them, an opportunity to acquire economic power by mobilizing their workforce skilfully maintained by newcomers networks.

While recognizing the multifaceted nature of the causes of conflicts between migrants and natives around real estate, Ibo (2012) emphasized the non-compliance with the clauses of the land sale agreements, the importance of the natives' demands vis-à-vis non-nationals in the tutoring, the youth calling into question land sale agreements once they are back to the villages, etc. For Babo (2010) ^[4], the economic crisis of the 80s is a key factor in the multiplication of hotbeds of tension over land. Why? Because the unemployment caused by the economic recession caused the reflux of urban populations to rural areas. This return to the countryside, which, in general, concerned the youth who dropped out of school and are unemployed, has led to many callings into questions the transactions around the earth between the seniors remained in the village and the migrants. So, these youths' claims of ownership of the land occupied by migrants are increasing; creating strong and also intergenerational community tensions (Bobo, 2012) ^[8].

From 1998, a significant change occurs in terms of real estate policy in Côte d'Ivoire with Law No. 98-750 of December 23, 1998. Until the enactment of this law, the Ivorian legislation used to deprive transfers of customary rights on land from any binding legal force and recognized but the transactions made before a notary. But the 1998 law innovates by agreeing to acknowledge as a transitional measure the customary rights before turning them entirely into individual and private formal rights (IDMC and NRC, 2009). It establishes a link between the identity of the occupant of the portion of land and the nature of land ownership (Dembélé, 2002) ^[16]. In other words, only the natives have the right to be owners of real estates. Implicitly, this mutation strengthens the power of the nationals on earth. However, for the migrants, it removed the implicit 'cover' they solely enjoyed due to their ability to exploit the land. It also generates a feeling of the decline of their flexibility in making real estate transactions with their hosts. But the resurgence of the question of autochthony in the 90s and the local logic of reappropriation of this 1998 Act, would be a breeding ground for outbreaks of violent conflict over land. The Ivorian southwestern part is the expression of these new violent dynamics that have developed around the earth, as shown by the extensive literature on the matter. Ultimately, real estate saturation issues (Chauveau 1983, 1990), intrafamily struggles (Kone, 2006; Babo, 2012) ^[8], tensions between natives and migrants (Kone, 2006, Babo, 2006 ^[4]), interpretation of the real estate law or the opposition between customary and modern rules (Chauveau, 2006 ^[14] Ibo, 2012), are at the heart of the conflict dynamics that evolve around land in Côte d'Ivoire.

But how were the relations of domination between natives and migrants structured in areas of cocoa production through the management of this resource, in connection with the changes in the national political field?

We mean by domination, the influence of a social group on another one, through the mobilization of resources (May they be material, financial, political, symbolic), the opportunities and links it has. Accordingly, this contribution shows how in the current context, migrants use the political capital they have, to establish their domination over the natives. In other words, it aims at showing how, in connection with the reversibility in the Ivorian political field, the balance of power between migrants and the natives has changed in the Ivorian southwestern part from the early years of forest exploitation in areas of cocoa production.

2. Materials and methods

As part of this study, secondary data collection through documentary search was complemented by primary data through interviews (individual or group) with community leaders and the populations at Touadji 2, in the the sub-prefecture of Méagui. As a sum, seven (7) individual interviews and four (4) focus groups were conducted. The discussions focused on the dynamics of social relations over land and the developments of the relationship between natives and migrants, depending on the political regime. The collected data have been used to document the socio history of the agronomy in this locality, real estate disputes and intercommunity relations.

The survey was conducted from May to June 2013, with several visits to Touadji 2. Located on the outskirts of the sub-prefecture of Méagui, Touadji 2 is a village with a composite demographic structure. The locality of Méagui was erected to the county town of the sub-prefecture in 1986. With the flow of migrants to the southwest, it experienced a population boom in less than a decade. With 7,684 inhabitants in 1988, the population of Méagui reached 15,998 inhabitants in 1994 (NSO, 1998); that is to say an increase of more than 100% within six (6) years. The Bakwé natives represent only 2% of this population. The sub-prefecture of Méagui houses alone 43% of Côte d'Ivoire cocoa producers (ENSEA, 2002). The field of study is then at the heart of the cocoa loop and is one of the examples of social recomposition in the southwest of Côte d'Ivoire. It is also a ground favourable to observing the relationship dynamics between migrant and native communities. The data collected were analyzed in terms of theories of social ties as developed by Durkheim and social capital as meant by Bourdieu and Coleman.

3. The results of the study

3.1 Ethno linguistics configuration and occupation of the studied area

Touadji 2 is a group of two villages that are Kladji Bakwé and Pogrégui. The Touadji were previously grouped near the Goh River and in the vicinity of Tai's classified forest. They were a group of seven villages called Sérapeuha Touadji. Touadji derives from the scriptural distortion of *To Adji* which means the children of *To*. During their migration to the current site, they were led by a great hunter named *Kla*. They thus settled around the Toutoubio River. But during the colonization, the visit of Captain Saviour will cause big changes. The track he created would link together Sassandra to Soubré. The opening of this road, however, caused the displacement of *To Adji*. They successively settled around the new road to enjoy the potential benefits of the traffic. The current site Touadji 2 should be the capital city of all Touadji. However, the disagreements over the choice of the relocation site would divide the group. They would then split up into four areas: Gnakorégui, Sakoragui,

Touadji 2 (made of three villages) and Touadji 2 which is a gathering of two villages (Konan, 2013) [22].

Touadji 2 has rapidly expanded with the arrival of migrants who, for the most part, were in search of land favourable to cocoa-growing. It now houses several ethno-linguistic groups among which the most representatives are the Burkinabe, the Baoulé and the Bakwé, as shown by the diagram below.




Chart: The number of households per community in Touadji 2
Data from our surveys, may 2013

In terms of ethnic-spatial configuration, the village of Touadji 2 is divided into three major areas representing the three largest communities living there. The Burkinabé district is separated from the Bakwé natives district by the main road linking Soubré to San Pedro. As for the Baoule district, it is separated from that of Bakwé by shallows.

3.2 Dynamics of the relations between natives and migrants from the independence to 2000

From the colonial period to the independence in 1960, the forest zones of Côte d'Ivoire attracted a significant mass of populations from the savannah and the neighbouring countries of Côte d'Ivoire such as Haute Volta, Mali and Guinea. The basis of this migration to these regions was the widespread growing of coffee and cocoa, and the desire of the newly independent State to seek for revenues to modernize the country (Diabate, 1973). At the Bakwé's for instance, the influx of migrants has significantly grown from the independence. The slogan "the land belongs to the one who exploits it" has accelerated this migration process. Subtly, it was also based on the posting of prefectural, judicial and security authorities in the host regions (Chauveau, 2000) [13]. In fact, for a successful policy, the State appointed the agents taking into account the ethnic origin of the migrants to facilitate their settlement. In this regard, the interviews reveal that the Sub-Prefect N'Dri Germain, from the centre of Côte d'Ivoire, was one of the key architect of real estate colonization by natives and non-natives in the locality of Méagui.

Despite the State's tacit support to migrants, the natives exerted control over the land during the pioneering years. They were the owners of the traditional rights over the rainforest and received the favours of genies. They were the only authority to summon for abundant harvests. In addition, they had the power to deny or allow access to land to whoever makes a request for it. In so doing, migrants were compelled to submit to the tutor to have a plot of land or to expand their arable land. In such a case, the tutor could get his 'strangers' make collective or

individual contributions for the sake of his children's education, funerals, travel or construction of a teaching hospital, a school, etc. A migrant's failure to contribute to these actions can lead to its isolation in case of conflicts or disputes on the exploited plot. Insidiously, the land was then used by the natives as a means of social pressure and control on migrants.

Until the advent of multiparty politics, tensions between migrants and natives were more or less contained. But with the opening of the political game in 1990, especially under Konan Bedie, they took a more open form. Latent frustrations have led to tensions that have gradually changed into conflicts (Babo, 2006) [4]. It was in such a context that the law on real estate was elaborated on December 23, 1998. The purpose of this law was to solve tensions around real estate issues between local actors. But in practice, the 1998 law would deepen the gap between communities (Chauveau, 2006) [14]. In the opinion of many observers, this law is the cause of political and military conflict that éclaté dans the country in September 2002.

3.3 Resurgence of autochthony and brutalization of the relations between migrant and natives during the armed conflict

The economic policy pursued by the Ivorian state after the independence has favoured the colonization of the land. It also promoted the cultural and ethnic mix. Despite the socio-demographic and linguistic recomposition it induced, communities more or less managed to contain the deadly violence. However, combined with the liberalization of the political market and the death of President Houphouët Boigny in 1993, the resurgence of the autochthony speech increased the erosion of relations between natives and migrants. Laurent Gbagbo's accession to power in 2000 only exacerbated inter-community tensions, because of the so-called ultranationalist hints of his regime.

In Touadji 2, controversies observed during the 2010 electoral contests have further rotted the relations between communities. So, more than four years after the war, the relations between natives and migrants are still marked by distrust and rejection of one another, based on a construction of logics of the scapegoat.

"Here, in the village when there is a problem and we ask for Baoule's help they will tell you I have just lost my relative in Bouake, this, that and the other. His host may even have problems it is 5 or 7% who meet the needs (...) That is their mentality" (P.C, a young native, Touadji 2).

The migrant communities' withdrawal into themselves is perceived as a lack of respect by natives and internalized as a frustration. It negatively affects the relations between the two sides:

"If they do not respect us we will not get on with them. I know people my dad hosted for 5 years, 6 years, in my house, as today they are rich when I get to their encampment, they dare not salute me" (NK, Leader of Youth, Touadji 2).

In such an atmosphere, migrants are more and more distrustful of landowners. They suspect them of wanting to take back their lands. For the Deputy Central Head of Méagui, the discourse of the 2010 presidential campaign is responsible for the increased division between communities:

"(...) Those who campaigned for the presidential elections, they deceived our brethren by saying that if this one is elected, the Bakwé will take your land back while we never thought of such a situation so make sure these words were meant to get people adhere to their ideas. We know each other here, we know our brothers (...) They are people who are very, very suspicious so this behaviour has spoiled the relations between them and us. "

But for some natives, the migrants' withdrawal into themselves goes back to long. Like IB, a native of Touadji 2 points out: *"It used to exist before but the election gave the opportunity to confirm it. It does not date from today. "* The post-election crisis would be, from that point of view, a pretext. In this conflict interaction, the 2011 regime change actually contributed to the collapse of the power of domination and control of the natives who, in relation to migrants, feel as if they are "foreigners on their own land."

3.4 From Gbagbo to Ouattara: the reversibility in the political field and the inversion of power relations between migrants and natives

Due to the significance of ethnicity in African politics, regime changes sound like the time to build hegemonic logic for the group coming into power. The positions of dominant group and dominated group depend on the increase or decrease of the capital politics.

In Touadji 2, the natives acknowledge that they are mainly close to the IPF former regime. During the ten-year reign of Laurent Gbagbo, native people more or less managed to gain the upper hand in the game of domination. At the political level, for example, civilian roadblocks were erected by natives on major routes of travel during the post-election violence of 2010-2011. The bulk of the victims of this practice were the migrants. Considering themselves as the victims of Laurent Gbagbo's political governance, the latter would take up the cause of Alassane Ouattara in 2010. Thus, many foreigners changed into armed combatants for the conquest of the power of State from March to April 2011, following the disputed results of the presidential election. Today, the advent of the Ouattara regime offers an opportunity to get rid of the natives "oppression".

"Crisis Time, while Gbagbo was still in power, the Bakwé again, (...), they had the power. (...) We distrusted them a little bit. (...) There were civilians roadblocks so that we often had to go through the bush to reach Méagui. The Bakwé, they even abuse us, they talk rubbish, go back home, go back home. Some Bakwé would go and tell the gendarm that this gentleman, he's like this and that. One day I myself got to the corridor (...) I paid 30,000 AF. He told me to pay 150,000, I said there is no money. The situation got wrong, he said if I did not have money, I would not move. I removed 30,000 AF, he took my identity card. (...) There are some roads to avoid trouble, there are (...), the Bakwé often go to the police station and show them these roads. There is a track here we follow to go to Méagui. The Bakwé, they no longer talk to us like that. They say 'wè' we shall see. This Old Tchédjan there, they cut him with a machete twice in Touadji here 2 during the crisis. (...) We did not react as we had no means. Some other day as we have brothers living in the bush over there, he sent his child to buy some Nescafé for morning coffee. (...) He beat him. (...), they took the child to the bush and kill him. What can we do as we have no strength oh! " (Z.M, a foreign trader, Touadji 2).

If the 2010-2011 post-election violences were a pretext for the migrants to take revenge on the natives for the injustices they suffered from, the Bakwé, meanwhile, believed that the Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (RFCI) in accordance with the migrants had deprived them of liberty. The RFCI were indeed the migrants' main resort, in case of disagreement with their hosts.

"When RFCI arrived here, some got up, (...) because they were their relatives and they said that Bakwé had guns. If there is something, their first resort to FRCI. (...). We, the owner of the village are forbidden to go to our sub-prefecture for a week, without moving, I am a faithful Catholic, this week I did not go to church, they did not want any Bakwé to pass his way (...) At first when he showed you the forest, he did not show you the forest with any gun. It was with his small machete. And he asked you to exploit it. But today I do not know on which earth of Côte d'Ivoire we now live on. It is the same Côte d'Ivoire, the same people who gave you, the same people, their children. Children who did not see you when you were given, today you are living with these children. To threaten the Bakwé with extermination? (...), Let time to time " (K.S, a notable, Touadji 2).

Obviously, in their relation to migrants, the natives' leeway is considerably reduced. They feel unable to respond to migrants who, thanks to the regime change, have real or so-called acquaintances with the administrative and judicial authorities.

"(...) They pull strings. Even in justice, even in the police station, even in the Subprefecture oh! They took everything. The Burkinabe is somebody who pulls strings. They have money, they took our place " (S.B, a young man, Touadji 2).

Finally, the advent of the new regime has toppled the relations of domination in favour of migrants. The frustrations experienced by the migrants in this locality during the reign of the former regime of Laurent Gbagbo were used to justify this "return the stick." The worst thing is the scarcity of land resources, which renders the natives more vulnerable as they see them escape from their hands whereas they used to be their main means of pressure on migrants.

4. Analysis and discussion of the results

The west-centre and the south-west were the two large areas of primary forest reserves in Côte d'Ivoire (Ibo and Leonard, 1994) ^[26]. In Touadji 2, this abundant southwest rainforest has quickly revealed insufficient not only for migrants, but also for Bakwé natives interested in cocoa-growing. The depletion of this resource has contributed to the intensification of the conflicts and the deterioration of the relations between communities.

In addition, the 90s wind of democratization and the identification of political parties on the standpoint of ethnic group has still caused a disintegration of the community social capital. Already tense in the early years of the establishment of multiparty politics, the relations between communities worsened with the 2002 armed rebellion. The 2010-2011 post-election violences deepened this social divide.

In the area of study, two major factors come into play in the coexistence of communities from diverse origins: land saturation and changes in the national political arena. On this last point, if the agricultural activities have enabled migrants to get significant financial resources and gain economic power,

the switching in the power relations seems to have genuinely occurred with Alassane Ouattara's coming to power.

4.1 The impacts of local socio-demographic recompositions on the construction of intercommunity relations

The peoples' quest for better living conditions is the cause of successive migratory waves in the locality. The relief and climate, which are very favourable for cocoa-culture have enticed a significant mass of people to Méagui, and namely to Touadji 2. This situation is not specific to Côte d'Ivoire. According to Alary (1996) ^[2], since the independence of Cameroon, the southwest of the country has also experienced significant immigration of people from the Northwest and Nigeria. This displacement is due to economic reasons. The salary labour offer in small cocoa producing units was the objective. Unlike these recomposed countries for economic reasons, Baldé (2007) ^[7] showed that the ethnic composition of Guinea was the result of the upheavals of the Sudanese empires from the IVth century.

In Touadji 2, the native population was flooded by the large number of economic migrants in the region. Gradually, the locality would face with insufficient arable land. The shortage of virgin forests and the size of migrants have rendered the landowners vulnerable, who, due to the dwindling of land resources, could no longer really have leverage over migrants. Just like Touadji 2 Tallet (1985) ^[28] pointed out that the southwest of Burkina Faso was a catchment area for populations of different origins, due to the favourable climatic conditions and the availability of land favourable for agriculture. Suddenly, the migration towards this region of Burkina Faso spread; up to the inversion of power relations between local actors. But as they were in majority, these migrants imposed their law on the natives as reported by the author.

Besides, Bakwé landowners' loss of their influence gradually happened with the migrants' failure to respect the tutoring, which the institution meant to rule the relationship between the two entities according to Koné (2006) ^[25]. In addition, the return to the land long ago advocated by the Ivorian state to reduce the employment problem of young people, has increased the pressure on seniors. On the one hand, the latter are faced with the demands of the youth back to the land, without land nor the profits of their ancestors' lands, and on the other hand, stands the empowerment of migrants. Thus, driven by the younger generation and eager to redefine the terms of land transactions, some native elders demanded the signing of new contracts on the plots of land occupied by migrants. But unlike Koné (2006) ^[25] who argues that conflicts between communities reflect intra-family conflicts in the centre-west of Côte d'Ivoire, the hereby study has revealed that sectarian violence results from a combination of factors. Among stands the major factor which is the reversibility in politics.

4.2 The change of political regime and reconfiguration of the relationship between local actors

The mobilization of ethnicity or the choice of one's political leader taking into account the ethno-linguistic origin is widespread on the Ivorian political spectrum. In fact, the feeling of superiority or domination of local actors is related to the ethnicity of the advocates of the State power.

As we pointed above, under the thirty-years governance of the DPCI, the policy of expanding export agriculture had been maintained through the extensive migration of Burkinabé and

Baoulé towards forest areas. Taking advantage of the facilities offered by the authorities of that period and the idea that "the land belongs to the one who exploits it" they invested huge and transformed dense forests into vast cocoa fields. Agriculture then allowed them to have a lasting settlement in these areas to develop other activities such as trade, and empower themselves economically. This was the beginning of a symbolic domination of the migrants upon the natives. However, more or less contained during the reign of the DPCI, the frustrations experienced or felt by native peoples of Touadji 2, would find a solution under the tenure of Laurent Gbagbo, but very often violently.

Stressing the Guinean example, Baldé (2007) ^[7] noticed that the sense of membership appears as a resource mobilized in the conquest of political and economic power. In Côte d'Ivoire, beyond the contradictions at the local level, the intercommunity dynamics of these last decades have revealed the relationship between the ethno-linguistic affiliation of the holder of the State power and the balance of power between communities. As a general rule, the communities feel that the fact that one of them is at the head of the State gives them the energy to impose on others. For migrants and especially the foreigners, the advent of Ouattara's power is a source of "relief". They now feel protected and able not to submit to their hosts pressure.

According to Durkheim (1897), the social link can derive from a community model in which the group membership and the strict obedience to the rules that are established are the primary form of the ratio between individuals. From our perspective, membership helps understand that the exercise of power by a political party has an influence on the social relationships between the migrants and the natives locally. Each community identifies with a political power. And the communities rely on special relationship or not they have with the ruling party to impose on others or to submit. As for the politics, they take into account their electorate in appointing their representatives in different parts of the country.

The victory of Ouattara's side after the armed clashes in 2010-2011 led the natives to live in fear and psychosis. As for the foreigners, they challenge the legitimacy of the natives' authority and prefer, in most cases, to refer to the FRCI for conflict resolution. Upon observation, the behaviour and strategies of the local actors are oriented according to the stakes and the situation encountered (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977) ^[15]. Subsequently, power is no longer linked to the possession of financial resources as pointed by the sociologist Babo (2010b) ^[6], or to the possession of the land, but rather to the political capital.

In a study conducted in Aboisso in the southern half of the country, Gnabéli (2007) had a different configuration in the relations between natives and the migrants in the villages of N'zobénu and Frambo. In these villages, the Appollo natives were demographically in minority. In N'zobénu for example, Attie immigrants are members of the local chiefdom. But among them by the ideology of autochthony, the Appollo were able to exercise their domination in the political governance of these localities and to have control over local resources.

Having said that, the identification of local actors to a political regime is crucial in the construction of power relations among communities. It provides one camp like the other one, with the resources to establish itself as the hegemonic actor or to submit as the dominated actor.

5. Conclusion

The social recomposition and violent changes in the Ivorian political landscape significantly affect the relations between actors in the cocoa-growing areas. This study shows that the relations of domination between migrants and natives in Touadji 2 in the Ivorian southwest are closely linked to changes at the head of the state. If the pioneer phase was favourable to migrants particularly in getting access and utilizing land resources with the DPCI in power, the decade from 2000 to 2010 was that of the natives under the regime of Laurent Gbagbo. This period was an opportunity for landowners to evacuate the frustrations they had endured for more than three decades. However, the fall of Laurent Gbagbo has undermined the natives and caused them to lose any influence on migrants. The current domination of the latter ones is the result of a process devised since real estate colonization with the migration policy and easy access to the forest allocation. In this perspective, what can be the place of natives in the Agricultural Innovation Project on the rejuvenation of old cocoa seedlings in the region? What are the changes that have occurred in the symbolic representation of the land among natives and migrants? These questions are worth exploring in future research.

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