

I bet you ten pounds it was Arab linguists who first discovered speech acts

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Abstract

The present paper is part of a larger project intended to show the contribution of traditional Arab Linguists to the basic notions and theories of pragmatics, in the present case speech - act theory. Special emphasis is laid on performatives, (explicit and implicit), the performative hypothesis, the descriptive fallacy and the descriptivist or complementarist view of performatives. The paper is an investigation of the question concerning whether traditional Arab linguists (rhetoricians, jurists and grammarians) were familiar with the basic notions of the theory. The conclusion is that Arab linguists were well acquainted with the basics of the theory centuries before modern pragmaticists.

Keywords: Speech acts, performatives, constatives, assertive, performative hypothesis, descriptive fallacy, traditional Arab linguists.

Introduction

Part I is a survey of the basic tenets of Speech Act Theory as it appears in the modern pragmatic literature, with quotations from the main advocates of the theory such as J. L. Austin. The issue of indirect speech acts and Searle's* contribution to the theory are addressed in a separate paper. In part II, The researcher tries to trace the basic notions of speech - act theory back to traditional Arab linguists. The method adopted to achieve this aim was to use quotations (sometimes, long ones) from their works to let them speak for themselves instead of putting word into their mouths. However, some explanatory comments were necessary to highlight the similarities, and sometimes the differences, between the achievements of traditional Arab linguists and those of modern pragmaticists. The innovation in the present study lies in the unprecedented discovery that Arab linguists of the middle ages were the first to discover speech acts and the function of language as a mode of action.

Part I

A brief Survey of the Theory

The interesting story of speech act theory (SAT) starts with J.L. Austin's discovery of a group of sentences which he labelled "performatives", in which the uttering of the words constitutes the performing of an action. He then set out to undermine an assumption which had dominated linguistic thought or philosophy for a very long time, namely the assumption that '*the business of a "statement" can only be to describe some state of affairs which it must do either truly or falsely*' (Austin, 1962:1). This assumption, which is known as the "descriptive fallacy," or the "constative fallacy", as the Oxford philosopher preferred to call it, concentrates exclusively on the informative function of language, and consequently gives more weight to truth conditions in language understanding. In this spirit, the logical positivist of the 1930s considered verifiability as a condition of meaningfulness.

It was in this context that Austin and Wittgenstein, the Cambridge philosopher, emphasized the pragmatic nature of language and communication, which is most faithfully reflected in speech acts, or language-games as Wittgenstein used to call them. They pointed out that the function of language is not limited to informing or describing states of affairs: language is a mode of action, too. We can use language to perform various sorts of acts, e.g. to marry, to divorce, to declare war, to bet, to thank, to apologize, to threaten, to object, to get people to do things, etc. Most of these acts depend on social institutions for their performance. In a number of lectures that were posthumously published under the title *How To Do Things With Words*, Austin started his programme by isolating some performative utterances:

1. I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.
I do (take this woman be my lawful wedded wife).
I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth.
I bequeath my watch to my brother.

Explicit performatives like these are a special class of utterances which are not frequent in everyday communication: people do not go about communicating by issuing explicit performatives. Many of these performatives are associated with some rituals or institutional procedures; as such, they are interesting but not very important linguistic phenomena. Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995) point out that they are part of the study of institutions. However, they are very important from a theoretical point of view: they constitute good evidence for or against linguistic theories. That is why Austin started his work by narrowing the focus on these "masqueraders", as he called them. Although they disguise as constatives in grammatical form, '*they do not "describe" or "report" or constate anything at all, i.e. are not "true or false"; and the uttering of the sentence is, or is part of, the doing of an action*', Austin (1962:5). He also points out (1962:4) '*Grammarians have not,*

* Searle's contribution to speech - act theory is addressed in Abdulla (2010)

I believe, seen through this "disguise", and philosophers only at best incidentally.' Then in a footnote rich with implications he says (1962:4) *'Of all people, jurists should be best aware of the true state of affairs. Perhaps some now are, yet, they will succumb to their own timorous fiction, that a statement of "the law" is a statement of fact.'* Austin's reference to jurists could be a coincidence, but it might be interesting to know, as I will shortly prove, that (pace Austin) it was the Arab and Muslim* jurists (law philosophers) (Usūlies) who first unmasked those "masqueraders" and saw through that disguise several centuries ago. Moreover, they always started their taxonomies of speech acts "Ma'ani al-kalam (speech forces) with the constative / performative distinction or "khabar / insha" distinction which was a commonplace among Arab Usūlies, rhetoricians, Philosophers, logicians and even grammarians. Then, Austin attempts to characterize the linguistic form of the explicit performatives in (1) above. He points out (1962:5) that *'all will have, as it happens, humdrum verbs in the first person singular present indicative active'*. According to Levinson (1983:244) this linguistic form is:

2. I (hereby) VP you (that).....

Where VP is a performative verb drawn from a limited and determinate set of verbs in the language in question.

According to Austin, to utter the sentences in (1) above in the appropriate circumstances *'is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it : it is to do it'*. (1962:6). In other words, these sentences are not used just to say things (describe states of affairs), but rather to do or perform actions. When I say "I do" or "I will" in answer to the curate's question in the marriage ceremony, the world will change substantially. That the uttering of these sentences constitutes the doing of actions, accounts for the fact that they cannot be assessed in terms of truth or falsity. Imagine commenting on the performative in (1) by saying: "That's false" or "That's true". These comments sound bizarre because they refer, not to pieces of information, but to actions; therefore, the question of truth or falsity simply does not arise; and this explains why the first sentence in (1) above is a performative whereas the following sentences are not:

3. I betted you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.
I am betting you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.
She bets you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.

According to Levinson (1983:231) *'This is hardly surprising, since if in uttering a performative, the speaker is concurrently performing an action, we should expect just those properties'*. However, this paradigm is not universal. In Arabic, it is possible, and more usual, to use the performative verbs in the past tense; and this, as one can imagine, creates, a very interesting ambiguity, between the real 'informative' (constative) past and the performative one, parallel to the ambiguity, in English, between the habitual and instantaneous interpretations of the simple present tense (see Leech, 1983:187). Thus, in the case of a husband who said to his revocably divorced wife *"I divorced you"*, Muslim

jurists of the past suggested asking the man whether he used his sentence performatively (to perform a new divorce) or informatively (to inform of a past one) in order to resolve the ambiguity*. If he said that it was a performative use, he would be committed to a second divorce. The number of divorces is legally important because it effects divorce and constrains re-marriage. (for the difference between revocable and definite repudiation see Schacht 1964). Muslim jurists asserted that the use of the performative verb in the past tense has the function of something like the perfective aspect: it indicates completion of the decision (gloss: it's done : you are divorced). But Austin himself also noticed that there are some performatives with the verb in the passive:-

4. Passengers are requested to return to their seats.

And there are others without subject or verb- e.g, "guilty!" uttered by the jury, or "out!" uttered by an umpire; therefore Austin had to concede that there are no reliable linguistic features which distinguish performatives from constatives unambiguously and systematically.

But Austin declares that although, unlike constatives, performatives cannot be assessed as true or false, they can go wrong (or be unhappy or infelicitous, in his terms) in various ways. Imagine yourself saying to the first person you come across in the street "I sentence you to ten years' imprisonment". In that case the action you attempt to perform is null and void, because there are certain institutional conditions that should be met before the successful performance of such an action. To mention but one, you should be the right person i.e. authorized or entitled to pass such a sentence. On the basis of such cases, Austin suggested three categories of conditions which must be satisfied for a performative act to be felicitous, and he termed them "felicity conditions":

- 5-A. (1) There must be a conventional procedure having a conventional effect.
- (2) The circumstances and persons must be appropriate, as specified in the procedure
- B. The procedure must be executed (1) correctly and (2) completely
- C. Often (1) the persons must have the requisite thoughts, feelings and intentions, as specified in the procedure and (2) if consequent conduct is specified, then the relevant parties must so do.

Some of these conditions are verbal: they have to do with the uttering of certain conventional words; others are non-verbal: they have to do with the conventional procedure and the appropriate participants etc.

Explicit and Implicit Performatives

Austin then discovered that the performative category covers a wider range of utterances, subsuming some, which are not of the highly conventionalized or ritualistic type, but are used in ordinary language situations.* Thus the uttering of the sentences: (6. a, b) could also constitute the performing of the

* I will use 'Arab' to refer to both Muslim and Arab scholars.
* See Ansari's commentary on Abdul-Shakūr's (D. 1119/1707) Musallam Thubūt (p.105)

* The explicit performatives which Austin isolated in the beginning were of the type that Searle (1976) later termed "Declarations" and Bach & Harnish (1979) termed "conventional illocutionary acts" distinguishing them from "communicative illocutionary acts".

acts that are depicted by their performative verbs, i.e. promising and warning.

6. (a) I promise that I shall be there.
(b) I warn you that there is a bull in the field.

Austin then drew a parallel between explicit performatives, which satisfy the linguistic form in (2) above or one of its varieties, and implicit performatives which do not conform to that form although it is assumed and implicit. Hence, (7a) and (7b) assume (6a) and (6b) respectively:

- 7 (a) I shall be there.
(b) There is a bull in the field.

This also applies to the three sentence-types, which are common almost in every language, namely the imperative, the interrogative and the declarative. Therefore, we can assume that the imperative contains the performative verb (*I order you to*), and the interrogative contains (*I ask you whether..*), and the declarative contains (*I state to you that*). Consequently, they are implicit performatives. But, then, this means that even, constatives are performatives: to say "*I state to you that ...*" is to perform the act of stating. Levinson (1983:231) points out that in Austin (1962) '*what is proposed at the beginning is rejected by the end*'. The main idea in Austin's theory of speech acts was the performative / constative distinction, but he ended up conceding that constatives *are* performatives. In other words, stating is a speech act like any other. We should not confuse the proposition with the speech act. Thus if I say (8), with or without the explicit performative prefix "*I state that*":

8. (I state that) Frege is the father of modern logic.

Then the proposition can be true or false. However, the speech act of stating cannot: it cannot be false that I have stated or that I have praised Frege. etc

The extension of the theory in this way sounds exciting but it may lead to the disconcerting conclusion that all the utterances we produce everyday are actions. But Bach and Harnish, (henceforth, B&H) (1979:304) point out that Austin dropped the performative/constative distinction, '*since constatives are performatives in the sense that they involve doing something. But they are also true or false (I state that ...). Still, he never came to hold that all performatives can be true or false*'.

This raises the issue of the acid test of a performative. How can we recognize a given utterance as a performative? Austin (1962:64) himself presents us with examples that satisfy the linguistic form of a performative but are nonetheless constatives or non-performatives.

9. (a) I bet him (every morning) sixpence that it will rain.
(b) I promise only when I intend to keep my word.
10. On page 49 I protest against the verdict.

The present tense in (9. a,b) indicates habitual behaviour and in (10) it is similar to the "historic" present. But these can be excluded using the "hereby" test. We cannot insert "hereby" in (9) and (10) above. According to Austin (1962:57) '*hereby* is a useful criterion that the utterance is performative'. But

Austin (1962:61) goes on to say that (hereby) '*is too formal for ordinary purposes...*'. He is then tempted to suggest another test:

that any utterance which is in fact a performative should be reducible, expandible, or analysable into a form with a verb in the first person singular present indicative active (grammatical)* (P.61).

This test helps in identifying the implicit performatives or performatives that do not satisfy the linguistic formula in (1) such as the utterances that lack a performative verb or that are in the passive voice. Let's call it *the reducibility test*; but it is not without its exceptions as Austin himself points out a few pages ahead, for we have not the formulas "*I insult you*" and "*I threaten you*" although I can insult you or threaten you by uttering certain sentences. And that is probably what Strawson (1974:291) meant in saying that '*it is a sufficient, though not, I think, a necessary condition of a verb's being the name of a kind of illocutionary act that it can figure, in first person present indicative, as what Austin calls an explicit performative*' (his emphasis).

Austin concludes his attempts by conceding the difficulty of finding a grammatical criterion for performatives. But he insists that every performative could, in principle, be put into the form of an explicit performative, and then a list of performative verbs could be made. But Austin recognizes a class of utterances which he calls "*expositives*" which have the form of a statement but are prefaced by a verb phrase which meets the criteria for performatives. And, as we noticed above, even "I state.." satisfies the performative test. Thus, all constatives turn out to be implicit performatives which are '*reducible or expandible or analysable*' into the form "I state that.". What started as a distinction between two classes of utterances ended up as a general theory in which to say anything one performs some kind of act.

Analysing a Speech Act into its Constituents

Austin, then, reconsidered the senses in which '*to say something may be to do something*' and suggested that a speaker can simultaneously perform three acts in issuing an utterance the *locutionary* act is the act of saying something with a certain sense and reference; the *illocutionary* act is the act performed in saying something, i.e. the act named and identified by the explicit performative. The *perlocutionary* act is the act performed by, or as a consequence of, saying something. Austin (1962:101) gave the following examples:

Act (A) or Locution

He said to me 'Shoot her!' meaning by 'shoot' shoot and referring by 'her' to *her*

Act (B) or Illocution

He urged (or advised, ordered, & c.) me to shoot her.

Act (C. a) or perlocution

He persuaded me to shoot her.

Act (C. b)

He got me to (or made me, & c) shoot her.

These acts are usually performed simultaneously, and Austin distinguished them for the sake of analysis. Within the

* Leech (1983: 174-75) opposes this thesis regarding it as a form of what he calls the "performative fallacy" and "the illocutionary-verb fallacy"

locutionary act, Austin distinguishes three subsidiary acts: a *phonetic* act of producing certain noises; a *phatic* act of uttering certain words belonging to a certain vocabulary, in a certain grammar; and a *rhetic* act of using the sentence with a definite sense and reference.

Austin focused his attention on the illocutionary act. It is the essence of the speech act and the two terms are often used interchangeably. The locutionary/illocutionary distinction is not very difficult: the locutionary act refers to the sense of what is said, whereas the illocutionary act refers to its force: how what was said was meant, i.e. whether the illocutionary force of the locutionary act was an order, a request, a piece of advice, a threat etc.

However, the perlocutionary / illocutionary distinction, is a bit more difficult. We can say of the utterance of "shoot her" above that it had the illocutionary act of ordering, requesting, advising the addressee to shoot her; and that it had the perlocutionary effect of, for example, forcing or persuading the addressee to shoot her. Briefly, an illocutionary act is a conventional linguistic act, whereas a perlocutionary act is a non – conventional non-linguistic one. The first is under the control of the speaker, while the second is not. That is why Austin distinguishes between perlocutionary *object*, i.e. the intended result of the act, and perlocutionary *sequel*, i.e. unintended result.

One can illustrate the perlocutionary / illocutionary distinction by contrasting lists of perlocutionary and illocutionary verbs. Thus, *to persuade, frighten, get h to do* etc. are perlocutionary, not illocutionary, acts because they cannot figure in explicit performatives:

- *11. I (hereby) persuade you
- *12. I (hereby) frighten you
- *13. I (hereby) get you to do.

Austin attempted a classification of illocutionary verbs using the explicit performative test and a concise dictionary. He came up with five main classes or categories: (*Verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, expositives*)

The Performative Hypothesis: A Reductionist Attempt

The central claim of speech-act theory is that illocutionary force is irreducible to matters of truth and falsity, but is to be evaluated in terms of felicity conditions and appropriateness. Illocutionary forces are not propositions: the latter describe states of affairs truly or falsely, whereas the former indicate how these propositions are to be taken: in an assertion, the addressee is meant to believe the proposition, in an order he is meant to make it true etc. Speech acts analysis is to be done in pragmatic terms not in truth-conditional semantic terms.

In brief, expressing a proposition is not the only function of language; language is also a mode of action, as exemplified in speech acts or illocutionary acts, which, unlike perlocutionary acts, are conventional.

Finally, although an illocutionary force can be expressed in various ways (using the implicit performative format in Austin's terms), the explicit performative format (in 2 above) is the yardstick or criterion for identifying and explicating it.

Levinson (1983:246), who calls advocates of the above position "Thesis theorists", suggests that '*one possible line for Thesis theorists is to claim that explicit performative prefixes are indeed treated semantically just like other non –performative clauses, but that, in addition, performative clauses have a force–indicating function irreducible to ordinary semantics*'. (Levinson's emphasis).

B&H (1979) and Leech (1983) adopt this position which Leech terms the "descriptive view" of performatives, contrasting it with the "non-descriptive view" taken by Austin, Searle and others. Leech argues that his descriptive view is a complementarist view- i.e. it is a compromise between what Levinson dubs the "irreducibility thesis" on the one hand, and "antithesis" or the claim that illocutionary force is reducible to matters of syntax and semantics, on the other. But before dealing with this complementarist view, we need to survey briefly the main tenets of the opposite position, "antithesis".

As we have mentioned above, antithesis is the attempt to assimilate illocutionary force to questions of syntax and semantics. Its extreme form is the "*performative analysis or performative hypothesis*" of John Ross and other generative semanticists. But Levinson (1983:247) points out that Lemmon (1962) and Hedenius (1963) claimed that by uttering explicit performatives the speaker makes them true just as the sentences in (17) are verified simply by their use:

- 17. I am here.
- I can speak this loud.
- I can speak some English.

Similarly, if you say "I hereby promise to come tomorrow" then the utterance is true- you have indeed promised.

According to the performative Hypothesis (PH), every sentence has in its deep syntactic structure a higher clause with the properties of an explicit performative (corresponding to 2 above) whether or not it is an explicit performative in surface structure. Hence, (PH) implies that (18a) has as its deep structure a performative like (18b):

- 18. a- Sit down.
- b- I request that you (or order you to) sit down.

The equivalence between the performative and non-performative is achieved by the optional "performative deletion" transformation. Thus, (PH) has it that all sentences are, in essence, performatives: an explicit performative is a special case where the performative deletion has not applied.

There are two unwarranted assumptions behind this procedure: it is assumed that illocutionary force is a grammatical matter. Hence, Sadock (1974:19) claims that '*illocutionary force is that part of the meaning of a sentence which corresponds to the highest clause in its semantic representation*'. The other assumption is that the surface-structure implicit performative form such as (18a) is equivalent in meaning to the deep-structure explicit performative in (18b). But this assumption is obviously untenable: (18a) and (18b) are stylistically distinct. But more importantly, they are relevant in different ways. (18b), the explicit performative, costs more processing effort than (18a). If this difference in processing cost is not offset by a difference in the amount of contextual effect, then (18b) will be less relevant than (18a). But it is easy to work out the extra contextual effect that (18b) achieves: the speaker could be classifying his speech act as an order; or alternatively he could be displaying his authority and so on. (See Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995 for details of the relevance-theoretic approach to meaning)

It might be interesting to point out that in the French tale of "Le Petit Prince" by Antoine de Saint Exupery, a dialogue rich with performatives takes place between the Prince and the Monarch, who is desperate to show his authority. Here is an example:

19. *Little prince*: Puis –je m'asseoir?-can I sit down?
Monarch: Je t'ordonne de t'asseoir!- I order you to sit down.

The fact that the monarch *chose* an explicit performative in preference to the shorter implicit performative "sit down" can be explained via Sperber and Wilson's principle of relevance since the extra processing effort of the longer expression is offset by the extra contextual implication that he wants to display his authority even when granting permission.

In one of the Arabic translations of this tale, the translator made an interesting error: the monarch's order utterance was translated as "I permit you to sit down". It is true that the monarch's order has virtually granted a permission, but French does not lack this expression or the implicit performative "sit down". The author's choice is obviously stylistically and pragmatically motivated. See Abdulla (2006).

The arguments which have been advanced in favour of and against the PH, are too many and too long to be included in the present limited account. However, PH lost much of its appeal and popularity and was subjected to criticism by many linguists. Now, it might be sufficient to sum up the main claims of PH in its strong version (Gazdar, 1979 in Levinson 1983: 250) in (20):

20. (a) *Every sentence has a performative clause in deep or underlying structure.*
 (b) *The subject of this clause is first person singular, the indirect object second person singular, and the verb is drawn from a delimited set of performative verbs, conjugated in the indicative active simple present tense (or is associated with the underlying representation thereof)*
 (c) *This clause is always the highest clause in underlying structure, or at the very least always occurs in a determinable position in the structure.*
 (d) *There is only one such clause per sentence.*
 (e) *The performative clause is deletable, such deletion not changing the meaning of the sentence.*
 (f) *Illocutionary force is semantic (in the truth conditional sense) and is fully specified by the meaning of the performative clause.*

(20f) seems to be crucial because it subsumes a form of what Austin called "the descriptive or constative fallacy": the performative at the deep structure or the surface structure levels will be truth-conditionally true when it is felicitously said. On this view, the question of falsity simply does not arise because felicity conditions are assimilated into the semantic concepts of entailment or semantic presupposition.

An important piece of evidence for PH advocated by generative semanticists, is the performative adverb or illocutionary adverbial, as B&H call it. These are adverbs which describe omitted performative phrases implicit in the deep structure of an utterance. Thus the adverbs "frankly, truthfully" in (21a) describe the implicit act of saying or stating in (21b):

21. (a) Frankly (truthfully) you bore me.
 (b) I say or state frankly (truthfully) that you bore me.

The Descriptivist or Complementarist View of Performatives:

Now we will have a short look at the complementarist approach to performatives adopted by B&H (1979) and Leech (1983).

B&H's approach is part of an ambitious programme or theory of linguistic communication comprising a speech act schema, a taxonomy of speech acts and three presumptions: the *linguistic, communicative and literalness presumptions*. It is an integration of SAT into a communicative theory. What we are interested in is their view of performatives as both doings and statings.

B&H (1979:203) point out that performatives (other than conventionalized ones) '*comprise two illocutionary acts. To utter a performative sentence is to do what one is stating one is doing; indeed that is what makes the statement true.*' Hence, they are of the same opinion as Lemmon and Hedenius above. Since Austin accepts that performatives are indeed doings of actions, B&H set out to prove that the negative side of his doctrine- that performatives do not constate (are not true or false) - is mistaken. According to B&H (1979:204) Austin's reason for thinking that performatives are not constatives is that '*in uttering a performative sentence, performing an act of the sort named by the verb is incompatible with one's also stating thereby that one is performing such an act.*' B&H wonder: '*But why cannot one both perform an act and in the same breath state one is performing it? Why should the use of certain verbs in a performative utterance be any less a statement than the use of the same verbs in non-performative utterances, just because this use is also something other than a statement?*'

B&H (1979:208) end up considering explicit performatives indirect illocutionary acts* of the standardized kind: the hearers' intended inference is compressed by precedent. '*The explicit performative formula is standardized for the indirect performance of the illocutionary act named by the performative verb.*' More explicitly, they (P.286) argue that '*literally they are statements and only indirectly do they have the force of the sort named by the performative verb. For example, a typical utterance of "I order you to leave" is literally a statement and only indirectly an order.*' Therefore, it is an indirect speech act in Searle's sense: a speech act performed by way of performing another. See B&H (1979:208) for the details of the steps of inferring the indirect illocutionary act from the direct one. They present us with six steps like the steps which Searle (see below) uses to show how a speaker infers the indirect force from the direct one. Here are the first three steps:

22. (a) He is saying "*I order you to leave*"
 (b) He is stating that he is ordering me to leave.
 (c) If his statement is true, then he must be ordering me to leave.

But usually this needlessly elaborate reasoning is short-circuited because there is ample precedent for it. B&H assert that the above claim applies only to communicative illocutionary acts. It should be remembered that, instead of Austin's performative/constative distinction, B&H adopt a communicative/conventional distinction. In their taxonomy, all the categories of illocutionary acts are communicative except the two categories of *effectives* and *verdictives*, which correspond to Seal's declarations. These effect institutional states of affairs and are not communicative because they are implemented not by recognition of intention but by convention. They are the very ones that Austin started his account of speech acts with.

* For indirect speech acts see H. I. Abdulla 2010.

Leech (1983:181) conceives of performatives in a similar way. He thinks that the performative is too unusual and exceptional to be underlying every single utterance: *'it occurs, understandably enough when a speaker needs to define his speech act as belonging to a particular category'*. Thus, *"I order you to stand up"* and *"stand up-and that is an order"* define themselves as orders. Leech (1983:189) argues that a performative is metalinguistic: it is a kind of reported speech (oratio obliqua). *'Semantically, it is a proposition with a present-tense verb, and is ambiguous between habitual and instantaneous interpretations. But pragmatically, it is a self-naming utterance which has the force indicated by its main verb'*. Leech (1983:191) summarized the assumptions behind his descriptive approach in the observations in (23)

23. (a) *performatives are often partly equivalent to their non-performative analogues, but*

(b) *performatives express additional meaning which, if conveyed at all, is only conveyed implicitly by their non-performative analysis.*

In order to show that performatives are propositions like all other sentences in declarative form, Leech (1983:182) suggests that performatives *may* be denied in special cases like the following:

24. a- *I sentence you to death.*

b- *Oh no, you don't. The death penalty has been abolished, and any way, you're not a judge.*

c- *I hereby agree with you that the United Nations is just a talking-shop.*

d- *Oh, no you don't. You don't agree with me, because my opinion is quite different from what you imagine...*

However, what is involved in (24b) and (24d) is not denials or falsifications but only indications of inappropriateness or presupposition failure, and these two notions are subsumed under Austin's felicity conditions. It is like arguing that *"The king of France is bald"* is false because there is no king of France. But this sentence has no truth value: the question of its truth or falsity simply does not arise. Here Leech seems to be adopting the PH view that felicity conditions are part of the meaning of the performative verbs, capturable either in terms of entailment or in terms of semantic presupposition.

PART II

Speech Acts in Traditional Arabic Linguistics

Prefatory Remarks:

Given the great number of texts and the immensity of the literature in traditional Arabic linguistics dealing with the various aspects of (SAT), one has to be very selective, and the following account cannot be but rough and sketchy.

The various issues of SAT dealt with in part I, e.g. the constative / performative distinction, the constative fallacy, the performative hypothesis, felicity conditions, analyzing a speech act into its constituents, etc., were all covered in traditional Arabic linguistics, where, astonishingly, you find almost the same controversies and arguments. These notions were very

common in the fields of "usul al-fiqh" (principles of Islamic jurisprudence), "balagha" (rhetoric) and even "nahu" (syntax). The influence of "mantiq" (logic) and "ilm al-kalam" (Islamic theology) on workers in the above fields is obvious.

The question of who was the founder of SAT will not be addressed in the present study. Although this will make it less dramatic than, for instance, the orientalist's discovery that Ibn-Khaldun was the founder of Sociology well before Auguste Comte, still it will not be less important. Most probably, the discovery of SAT was not the achievement of a single thinker. What is almost certain is that the discovery was made by the "Usūlies" i.e. Islamic jurists, whose job was to lay principles and rules for interpreting the meaning of the holy Quran and prophet Muhammed's tradition or sayings. "Fuqaha" (Islamic law-makers), then, would use these principles and rules to interpret the holy text in their attempt to make laws. One can easily imagine how much inference and deduction this sort of work involved. The "Usūlies" were the first pragmaticists: they knew the inferential nature of communication and discovered speech acts and implicatures and they had a conception of a general notion of relevance and of its role in interpretation. Here we are going to give a sketchy account of speech acts only (for details see Abdulla, forthcoming). The issue of implicature and the role of relevance are also addressed in (Abdulla, 2015)

Our present account is not chronological: we are not going to quote or deal with the Arabic traditional texts in the order in which they were written. We will select for each aspect of SAT one or two texts that are clear and simple, regardless of their dates. We are always on solid grounds since most of the texts we will quote were written between the fifth and twelfth centuries after Hegira (AH) i.e. approximately between the eleventh and eighteenth centuries AD, and the latest text was written about two centuries before Austin made his discovery, or rather, re-discovery.

The same ideas were transmitted from generation to generation and from discipline to discipline. Occasionally, you come across an innovation, some addition or a simple modification of terminology, but the basic ideas and insights remained almost the same across the centuries and often the same illustrative examples were used. The reason behind this is that the majority of books were commentaries on earlier books. Hence, we have commentaries on commentaries, and scholiums or glosses on these commentaries and so on, dealing with the same ideas but with differing degrees of detail and innovation.

The Insha / Ikhbar (Performative /Constative) Distinction

In what comes, I shall try to let the traditional texts speak for themselves keeping my comments to a minimum. The idea is simply to give the reader a flavour of the issues that were raised. We shall try to raise questions and remind the reader of parallel notions in modern pragmatics avoiding, as much as possible, *reading things into* the texts.

Since our approach is not chronological, we shall start our survey with an extract from a grammar book "Shuthür Al-Thahab" written by a scholar from the later generation, Ibn-Hisham (D. 761/1359)* where he mentions a method of

* When an Arab scholar is mentioned for the first time, the year of his death is given in AH and AD. For the referencing of classical Arabic books, I mention the book name in addition to the author when I quote. The translations of the quotations into English are my own, and you

will find the original Arabic texts in the appendix at the end of the paper.

classifying speech: A trichotomy of "khabar," "talab", "insha" (assertive*, directive, performative) : (Text A)

...and I say: in the same way that words are classified into three categories: nouns, verbs and particles, speech is also classified into three categories: "khabar" (assertive), "tatab", (directive) and "insha" (performative). The criterion of this is that speech is either verifiable and falsifiable or not. Thus, if it is, then it is "khabar" (assertive) such as ((Zaid stood up)) and ((Zaid did not stand up)), and if it is not, then either the existence of its meaning is subsequent to that of its utterance, or they are simultaneous. If it is subsequent to it, then it is "tatab" (directive) such as ((Beat!)), ((Do not beat!)) and ((Did Zaid come to you?)); if they are simultaneous, then it is "insha" (performative) such as saying to your slave ((you are free)) or saying ((I accept this marriage)) in answer to a marriage proposal.

However, he subscribes to a dichotomous classification into "Khabar" and "insha" (assertive and performative):

In this classification, I have followed some [scholars]. However, evidence runs against it, and speech is divided into assertive and performative only, directive being a subcategory of performative: the signification of ((stand up!)) is achieved simultaneously with its utterance and is not subsequent to it. What in fact is subsequent to it, is the "imtiḥal" (compliance or obedience) and *this is external to the signification of the utterance*, and since this category is characterized by the fact that its meaning or signification is created by its very utterance, it is termed "insha" (performance or, literally, creation) (Shuḥūr Al-Thahab p.31).

Obviously, this text is loaded with different issues of SAT. To mention but a few, it contains Austin's basic insight that in addition to stating facts, language can function as a mode of action, and it also contains the test for the distinction between actions and assertions. Ibn Hisham seems to be aware of the illocutionary / perlocutionary distinction the illocutionary act of issuing an order and the perlocutionary effect of doing the action, which is external to the linguistic, or pragmatic signification of the utterance; or as another linguist Al-Suyuti (D. 911/1505) (Al-Itqan: 75) put it: '*As for the beating which follows the order, it is not the directive signification itself but a consequence of it*'. Ibn Hisham seems to reject the perlocutionary effect as a criterion for categorizing speech acts at the basic level because it is external to language. But I think the major source of controversy lies in the way we interpret the claim that the meaning or force of certain sentences is created or performed "*by their very utterance*". I think that there must be some misconception, because the examples with which the proponents of trichotomy illustrate these performative sentences, are not only non-directive but also, and more importantly, of the very type which Searle calls Declarations, where '*saying makes it so*', and Leech (1983: 180) describes as conventionalized compartmentalized acts, which are a direct means to a goal and agrees with B&H that '*they are conventional rather than communicative acts: the linguistic*

parts of a ritual'. Perhaps this was what was meant by that expression in Ibn-Hisham's text, and the best explanation of what was meant by the meaning being created by the utterance. (see the quote from Taftazani below)

The later generation of linguists subscribed to dichotomy and they spoke of two categories of "khabar" (assertion or statement) and "insha" (performative), which is further divided into "talabi" (directive) and "ghayr talabi" (non-directive), thus subsuming "talab" under "insha" as a sub-category.

As an example of the distinction between the performative and non-performative uses of an utterance (in this case due to a difference in linguistic form) we quote Taftazani (D. 793/1390) in his commentary (Al-Mutawal) on Qazwini's (Talkhis), which is a précis of Sakkaki's (Miftah). After a definition of the meaning of truth in terms of the relationship between what he terms "mental predication", "linguistic predication" and "the external- world predication", he says: (Text B)

Thus, if you say 'I sell...' intending to inform, then there has to be in the external world a sell transaction, which exists independently of this utterance, and which this utterance is intended to correspond to, or identify. By contrast, a performative utterance of (I sold...) has no external [fact] which it is intended to correspond to or identify, *but rather the very act of selling is instantaneously performed or realized by the very act of uttering, and this utterance creates it* (my emphasis)

There is no question that the italicized words above explicitly spell out what was meant by the meaning being "created" by the utterance in Ibn-Hisham's text.

We have emphasized in part (1) that Austin's characterization of the linguistic form of an explicit performative is not universal. In Arabic there are at least three forms: one using the past tense of the performative verb, another using the present tense, and yet another using nominal sentences (of nominal predicate); and for each performative function there is usually at least one possible linguistic form. In Arabic, unlike English, the past tense of the performative verb is a bit more frequent in performative use than the other forms. You can perform the speech act of selling by using the past tense not the present. But Taftazani above does not discuss the linguistic forms explicitly because he assumes knowledge of these common facts; instead, he concentrates on the difference between the performative and non-performative uses.

For a discussion of the various linguistic realizations of a performative let us quote Abul-baqa (D. 1094/1682) (Al-Kulliyat vol.1, p.332). After classifying "insha" (performatives) into "insha talabi"(directive performative) and "insha gayr talabi" (non-directive performative) or "insha iqai"(effective performative) as it is sometimes called, he then discusses the different linguistic realizations of the latter: (Text C)

as for the [insha] 'iqai' (effective performative) it is of various forms: some are past tense verbs, others are present tense verbs transformed from their original assertive (constative) meaning. Examples of past tense performatives are contracts and annulments performed by the speaker as soon as he indulges in the contract or oath. Examples of present tense ones are such performatives as: ((I bear

* I use this term to refer to statements or assertions as opposed to performatives and equivalent to Austin's constatives

witness by God that.)) and ((I swear by God that.)) and ((I seek refuge in God)), which he [the speaker] utters when performing the acts of bearing witness, taking an oath and seeking refuge. Yet others are sentences of nominal predicates, also transformed from their original assertive meaning e.g. the speaker's uttering of ((you are free)), ((you are divorced)) and ((Praise [be] to God)) at the same time of performing the acts of emancipation (manumission), divorce and praise, respectively))

An earlier text is Qarafi's (D. 684/1285) book *Al-Furūq* (Distinctions) vol.1 P.18-61), which stresses the conventional and institutional nature of "insha" and deals with different forms of "insha" and the role of convention in deciding these forms: (Text D)

the sixth problem concerns the different linguistic forms used in issuing performatives. Conventions and customs have it nowadays that in testifying or bearing witness the speaker should use the present tense [of the performative verb] and not the past tense or the present participle; thus he says ((I testify or bear witness that so and so in your presence)) but had he said ((I testified or bore witness that so and so)) or ((I am testifying or bearing witness that)), it would not be acceptable. In selling, on the contrary, the speaker should use the past tense, not the present tense. Thus if he said ((I sell you that at the price of ...)), the sale would not be performed.... Divorce is performed using the past tense e.g. ((I divorced you three times)) or the past participle* ((you are divorced three times)) and not the present tense ((I divorce you)).The reason behind these differences has to do with the conventional transformation of force from assertive into performative.

At the end of their accounts of the controversy between the Shafites and Hanafite**, both Qarafi and Ibn Qayim Jawzia (D. 751/1350) adopt a stance which is a compromise in a way that is quite similar to Leech's (1983)and Bach & Harnish's (1979) middle position or descriptivist approach, as Leech calls it. For lack of space, we exemplify the descriptivist or complementarist approach with the following quote from Ibn Qayim's (*Badaii Fawaiid* vol.1 p.11). After surveying the arguments of each party, he goes on to make a case for his middle position: (Text E)

....Now we come to the end of the arguments of each party. The adjudication of the dispute is that these formulas have two types of predications: one is a predication to the external states of affairs they effect; in this respect, they are pure performatives as the Shafites and Henbelites claim. The other is a predication to the speaker's intention or will, and in this respect, they are assertions of what the speaker intends to perform, as is the claim of the Hanafites. Thus, they are assertives with regard to their mental or psychological meanings, and they are performatives with regard to the external states of affairs they effect. Hence, it is not plausible to claim that they are verifiable or falsifiable even if they are assertives because the meaning or

signification of verification and falsification or negation and affirmation is the correspondence or otherwise between the assertion and the asserted. But here the asserted is effected by the act of assertion in the same way as the effect is effected by its cause; therefore verification and falsification are unthinkable in this case. However, they are possible in an assertion whose signification was not effected by its utterance e.g. "Zaid stood up"...

Here and elsewhere (*Badaii Fawaiid* Vol. 2 p.139 and *Ilam Muwakiin* Vol.3 p.131) Ibn Qayim, like B&H 1979, claims that performatives are both doings and statings, even if B&H were specifically referring to performatives other than conventionalized ones. His claim is also close to Leech's (1983:189) claim that explicit performatives are semantically ordinary propositions but pragmatically they are self-naming utterances, which are used to perform the sort of acts they name.

The Performative Hypothesis: an Arabic Version:

Leech's descriptivist approach to performatives is, in the first place meant as a compromise between the Austinian non-reductionist approach and the reductionist approach of the proponents of the PH. Did Arab linguists know the PH? I have found in *Al-Qadhi Abduljabbar Mutazili* (D. 415/1024) a proponent of an extreme version of PH and the constative fallacy. He claims not only that every sentence has a deletable performative clause in its underlying structure, but also that that performative clause is in fact assertive. Thus he ends up equating linguistic communication in general with assertions in his encyclopaedic book (*Al-Mughni* vol. 15, p.325): (Text F)

Know that assertion is the basis of meaningful speech, because all the meaning that are conveyed through speech must be reducible to assertive or its equivalent. But its signification could be interpreted by its explicit linguistic form, in which case it is called an assertive, or it could be interpreted by its force in which case it is called otherwise; but the signification is the same. This is indicated by the fact that the imperative replaces your saying "I want you to do ..." and the prohibitive [negative imperative] replaces your saying "I want you not to do....", and if one asks a question, it will replace one's saying "I want you to inform....", and if one uses the vocative for calling others, it will replace one's saying "I want you to listen to what I say and come to me" and so on. (My italics)

Then he goes on to explain the difference between pure assertives, which express propositions, and assertives which express the attitudes of the speaker such as requests and likes and dislikes, and the role of convention. The italicized sentences above are parallel to what the generative semanticists called "the performative clause in deep or underlying structure". However, Abdul-Jabbar went further to argue that this performative clause is in fact an assertive, hence his claim that every speech act is originally assertive.

But the last argument of PH proponents (20f) which we quoted from (Levinson 1983:250) leads to the same conclusion that Abdul-Jabbar reached. Much of the dispute depends on how

* literally: present participle "taliq", because in Arabic you can derive from the root "tallaqa" an intransitive verb of which the logical object (divorcee) is the grammatical subject, but I have decided to ignore such complexities.

** In Abdulla (forthcoming), I have given the details of the extremely sophisticated and highly technical debates between the Shafites and Hanafites, which for lack of space, cannot be covered here

you see the performative clause: Austin, contrary to Abdul-Jabbar, claims that all speech is performing action, because he considers the underlying clause a performative; therefore, even explicit constatives are performatives. This Leech (1983:175) calls the "performative fallacy".

By contrast, Abdul-Jabbar, who seems to subscribe to the Hanefite claim that performatives are constatives (the Arabic version of what Austin calls the "descriptive fallacy"), argues that all speech, performatives included, is constative whose function is to describe some state of affairs.

It seems as if both parties were caught in a vicious circle. Both are involved in the abstractions which Austin (1962:144) refers to: '(a) *With the constative utterance we abstract from the illocutionary (let alone the perlocutionary) aspects of the speech act, and concentrate on the locutionary ...* (b) *With the performative utterance, we attend as much as possible to the illocutionary force of the utterance, and abstract from the dimension of correspondence with facts*'.

Astarabadi: Constatives Can be Performatives, too:

It might be interesting to point out that even in his claim that statements can also be performatives, Austin (1962:133) was preceded by a Muslim linguist, Redhiddin Astarabadi (D. 688/1289). Austin says that both the following implicit and explicit forms of utterance:

- He did not do it.

- I state that he did not do it.

seem to '*meet all the criteria we had for distinguishing the illocutionary act*'. In other words, constatives have their underlying performative clauses, too; hence, stating is also a form of action because it is not falsifiable; in fact, what is falsifiable is the propositional content of the statement not the act of stating.

Astarabadi in his (Sharh Al-Kafia vol.2 p.311) (a commentary on Ibn Hajib's Kafia) after addressing the issue of the difference between performative and assertive and whether the act of praising or approbation is the one or the other, goes on to express one of his important ideas: (Text G)

.....and yet I have my own view with regard to that idea, for it extends and applies to all assertives, because if you say "Zaid is better than Amr", which is undoubtedly an assertion, your act of preferring will be unfalsifiable: nobody can say to you "you did not prefer". However, what is falsifiable is whether Zaid is better. By the same token, if you say "Zaid is standing", which is undoubtedly an assertion, it will not be verifiable or falsifiable in respect of the act of asserting or informing, for nobody would say to you that you did or did not assert or inform. The reason is that in the very act of uttering you have created (performed) the assertion. However, it is falsifiable and verifiable in respect of the state of standing; hence one can say that it does or does not exist...

However, these ideas of Astarabadi did not escape criticism from one of his commentators. Sharif Al-Jurjani (D. 816/1413), in a detailed marginal gloss on Astarabadi's (Sharh Kafia), rejects his analysis. But for lack of space, we quote only a few lines: (Text H)

It cannot escape you that the preference in this case does not mean that you make him [Zaid] better; it is rather informing that he is better. But then *the act* of asserting or informing,

which is the act of the speaker, is not the fundamental or basic signification of the assertive utterance nor is it intended by it. The fundamental signification intended by it is rather the *judgment* which specifies the *predication* between its two terms, and that is capable of being true or false, as in saying "Zaid is standing". Hence it is not basically a performative.....

Obviously, both scholars show awareness of Searle's distinction between what he called a "propositional act" and an "illocutionary act". However, before I deal with the main issue in this debate, I would like to draw the reader's attention to its close resemblance to the debate about the descriptive fallacy.

Austin (1962:2) made a revolution in philosophy by drawing attention, not only to performatives, but also to ethical and aesthetic propositions that masquerade as statements such as "Monet is better than Manet"; see Lyons (1981) for details. Austin's and Lyons' comments on this sentence are reminiscent of Astarabadi's analysis of his example "Zaid is better than Amr" and Jurjani's gloss thereon. It is left to the reader to draw implications from this resemblance.

What is mainly at issue in these debates and the present-day debates between the reductionists and non-reductionists comes down to the "ismi / masdari" distinction (literally, nominal/ infinitival / senses of an utterance), which is very close to modern linguists' distinction between '*utterance acts*' and '*utterance products*', or the French *enonciation / enonce* (Lyons, 1977, vol.1, p.26). Arab linguists (e.g. Taftazani and other commentators on Talkhis Qizwini, Vol.2, p.235 and Tahanawi (D. 1158/1745) in his encyclopaedic Kashaf, Vol.6, p.1360) distinguish between the "ismi" and "masdari" senses of utterances, whether of the two major types (assertive and performative) or of their hyponyms or subdivisions of illocutionary acts.

Much of the above disputes can be traced back to the confusion of these two senses or to the controversy over them. Arab linguists disagreed about what was the normal sense of those utterances: the nominal or the infinitival. Al-Tahanawi (Kashaf Vol.6, p.1360) in the entry for 'Insha' (performative) says: (Text I)

'Insha' (performative) is used by Arab linguists to refer to an utterance whose predication has no external to which it may or may not correspond. Its opposite is 'khabar' (assertive).....It may also be used to refer to *the act of the speaker*, I mean the uttering of the performative utterance, in which case its opposite will be 'ikhbar' (the act of asserting). What they mean by 'insha' when they say that 'insha' is divided into request [directive] and otherwise, and request is subdivided into..., is the second sense i.e. 'masdari' (infinitival), and not the utterance which contains it. The explanation is as follows....

Then he goes on into the details explaining this distinction between the two concepts of utterance as a process and as a product, which for lack of space, cannot be covered here. But it might be interesting to notice with Tahanawi that while the term 'insha' is, like 'utterance', ambiguous in that it could indicate both the act of the speaker and the product of that act, the Arabic equivalent term for 'assertion' or 'constative' is free from such ambiguity. In Arabic, we have the two terms of 'Khabar' and 'Ikhbar' which are parallel to the French 'enonce' and 'enonciation' or utterance-product and utterance-act.

The interpretation of the utterance as a process (an act of the speaker) leads to focusing on the relation between the utterance and its utterer and thus it would be conceived as a self-referring act, because it has nothing to refer to but the act of the utterer, which constitutes the utterance itself.

Pierre Larcher, a French orientalist who wrote on the pragmatic elements in the grammatical theories of Arab grammarians, compares the above concept from Astarabadi with similar concepts in the works of Ducrot, Benveniste and others. In Larcher (1990:200) he points out:

L'interprétation du insha 2 comme énoncé sui-référentiel, au sens de Ducrot (1977), i.e. comme faisant référence à sa propre énonciation (et, en ce sens, tout énoncé est sui-référentiel et non pas les seuls 'performatifs') trouverait confirmation dans le fait que, dans un troisième et dernier temps, il n'a pas manqué d'auteurs pour s'aviser que, non pas le khabar "affirmation", mais le ikhbar "act d'assertion" était aussi un insha. Astarabadi est l'un d'eux.....

Larcher also shows that Astarabadi and other linguists knew *performative adverbs* or *illocutionary adverbials*, which were put forward by the generative semanticists as evidence for PH. In his analysis of "maful mutlaq" (cognate object) of sentences like

- Thalika Isa bnu Maryam qawla-l-haqqi
(Truthfully, that is Jesus son of Mary)
- Zaydun qa'imun haqqan.
(Truthfully, Zaid is standing)

Astarabadi argues that the deleted unarticulated phrase underlying these sentences is an object to the verb of saying, i.e. the very act of the speaker: "qultu qawlan haqqan" (I state truthfully that ...).

Analysing a Speech Act into its Constituents

Austin ended with the claim that, generally speaking, all utterances are performatives, i.e. are also doing things, and this led him to consider the senses in which "to say something may be to do something": the *locutionary*, *illocutionary* and *perlocutionary*.

In this regard too, the contributions of Arab linguists (jurisprudents and rhetoricians) were considerable. Again we have to be selective and brief.

It may suffice to give an example from the Usūlies. These were pragmaticists because they were motivated by the practical need to derive Islamic law (legal rules) from the Holy Quran and the Mohammedan tradition, a task that involves interpretation and setting rules that guide it.

The most important category for the Usūlies was directives because most legislations were usually either orders or prohibitions. Usūlies concentrated exclusively on directives; however their analyses and terminology can be extended to other SA categories

Ghazzali (D. 505/1111) in (Al-Mustasfa vol.1) provides us with a detailed account of the analysis of "Amr" (order or command) into its constituents. In answer to the question concerning what

makes "amr" what it is some usūlies said that what makes an order what it is, is its linguistic form, others said it is its intended effect (or perlocutionary effect in Austin's terms); yet others argued that it is the equivalent of the illocutionary intention that makes it what it is.

Ghazzali (Mustasfa vol. 1, p.414) gives an account of the different approaches to the analysis and definition of "amr": (Text J)

The third party of Mutazilite* scholars say: it [amr or command] does not become what it is due to its form or mood, nor due to its form when it is decontextualized; rather it becomes 'amr' due to three kinds of intending: 1. *intending to produce the linguistic form (utterance)* 2. *Intending to mean by that form a command and not, for instance, a permission or a threat.* 3. *intending that the command be carried out or obeyed.* Some argued that one intention is sufficient, viz., intending the command to be carried out. But this is untenable for a variety of reasons (my italics)

Although the above text is apparently an attempt at defining 'amr' and its felicity conditions, an important outcome or byproduct of this attempt is a description of the three aspects of 'amr' which is generalizable to all other SAs. It is not difficult to see the close resemblance between 1, 2 and 3 in the above text and Austin's locutionary*, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts respectively.

Conclusion

Using many quotations from traditional Arab and Muslim jurisprudents (usūlies), we have seen that they were well acquainted with the basic notions of modern SAT. The constative/perlocutionary distinction, the descriptive fallacy, the performative hypothesis, the descriptivist or complementarist view of performatives and the analysis of SAs into locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts were all notions familiar to usūlies, who engaged in debates and controversies very similar to those taking place in modern SAT. The difference between the Arab linguists' account and the modern account is only in terminology and that does not affect the findings in any significant way. It is recommended that more research should be done along the same lines in order to support the findings of the present study.

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- 6 Ibn-Qayim, S. (undated) Badaii Fawaiid. Cairo: Al-Muniriya Press.

because the form is used for other meanings than command such as threatening, and the only criterion is intention".

* The contribution of Arab linguists to the analysis of a locutionary act into phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts is addressed in Abdulla (2012).

* According to Attar in his commentary on (Jami Jawami, vol.1, p.476) these Mutazilite scholars were Abu-Ali Jubbai (303, AH) and his son Abu-Hashim Jubai (321, AH): "In addition to the higher status of the speaker, Abu-Ali and his son Abu-Hashim consider the intention to mean a command by the form, otherwise it would not be a command

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Appendix

The Original Arabic Texts Quoted in Translation

(Text A)

“وأقول كما إنقسمت الكلمة الى ثلاثة أنواع: إسم وفعل وحرف، كذلك إنقسم الكلام الى ثلاثة أنواع: خبر، وطلب، وإنشاء، وضابط ذلك إنه إما أن يحتمل التصديق والتكذيب، أو لا؛ فإن احتملها فهو الخبر نحو ((قام زيد)) و ((مقام زيد))، وإن لم يحتملها فإما أن يتأخر وجود معناه عن وجود لفظه، أو يقترنا، فإن تأخر عنه فهو الطلب، نحو ((اضرب)) و ((لا تضرب)) و ((هل جاءك زيد؟)) وإن اقترنا فهو الإنشاء، كقولك لعبدك: ((أنت حر)) وقولك لمن أوجب لك النكاح: ((قبلت هذا النكاح)). وهذا التقسيم تبعاً فيه بعضهم، والتحقيق خلافه، وإن الكلام ينقسم الى

خبر وإنشاء فقط، وأن الطلب من اقسام الإنشاء، وإن مدلول ((قم)) حاصل عند التلفظ به ولا يتأخر عنه، وإنما يتأخر عنه الامتثال، وهو خارج عن مدلول اللفظ، ولما اقتص هذا النوع بأن إيجاد لفظه إيجاد لمعناه سمي إنشاءً.

(Text B)

فإذا قلت: ((أبيع)) وارتدت به الاخبار الحالي فلا بد له من وقوع بيع خارج وحاصل بغير هذا اللفظ بقصد مطابقتها لذلك الخارج بخلاف: ((بعت)) الإنشائي، فإنه لا يخرج بل البيع يحصل في الحال بهذا اللفظ، وهذا اللفظ موجد له. له بقصد مطابقتها،

(Text C)

“ثم الإيقاعي منه على أنحاء. منها أفعال متصرفة ماضية، أو مضارعة حالية بعد نقلها عن معانيها الاصلية الاخبارية. أما الماضي فكألفاظ العقود والفسوخ الصادرة عن المتكلم حال مباشرته العقد والقسم. وأما المضارع فنحو: ((أشهد بالله)) و ((أقسم بالله)) و ((أعوذ بالله)) الصادرة عنه حين أداء الشهادة والقسم والاستعاذة. ومنها أفعال غير متصرفة منقولة أيضاً عن معانيها الاصلية الاخبارية بلا استعمال فيها بعد النقل، كأفعال المدح والذم والمقاربة والتعجب. وفيها حروف كواو القسم وبائه وتائه و((رب)) و ((كم)) الخبرية و((لعل)). ومنها جمل اسمية اخبارية بعد النقل أيضاً كقول القائل: ((أنت حر)) و((أنت طالق)) و ((الحمد لله)) على قول، أي حال (6) اعتاقه وتطبيقه وحده.”

(Text D)

المسألة السادسة في بيان الفرق بين الصيغ التي يقع بها الإنشاء. الواقع اليوم في العادة أن الشهادة تصح بالمضارع دون الماضي واسم الفاعل فيقول الشاهد أشهد بكذا عندك أيك الله ولو قال شهدت بكذا أو أنا شاهد بكذا لم يقبل منه. والبيع يصح بالماضي دون المضارع عكس الشهادة فلو قال أبيعك بكذا أو قال أبيعك بكذا لم ينعقد البيع. وإنشاء الطلاق يقع بالماضي نحو طلقك ثلاث واسم الفاعل نحو أنت طالق ثلاث دون المضارع نحو أطلقك ثلاثاً وسبب هذه الفروق بين الأبواب النقل العرفي من الخبر إلى الإنشاء.

(Text E)

فهذه نهاية اقدم الطائفتين في هذا المقام. (وفصل الخطاب) في ذلك أن لهذه الصيغ نسبتين نسبة الى متعلقاتها الخارجية فهي من هذه الجهة إنشائية محضة كما قالت الحنابلة والشافعية، ونسبة الى قصد المتكلم وإرادته وهي من هذه الجهة خبر عما قصد إنشائه كما قالت الحنفية. فهي إخبارات بالنظر الى معانيها الذهنية، إنشائية بالنظر الى متعلقاتها الخارجية وعلى هذا فإنما لم يحسن أن يقال بالتصديق والتكذيب وإن كانت أخباراً لأن متعلق التصديق والتكذيب والنفي والإثبات ومعناها مطابقة الخبر لمخبره أو عدم مطابقتها. وهنا المخبّر حصل بالخبر حصول المسبّب بسببه فلا يتصور فيه تصديق ولا تكذيب وإنما يتصور التصديق والتكذيب في خبر لم يحصل مخبره ولم يقع به كقولك ((قام زيد)) فتأمل.

(Text F)

إعلم إن الخبر هو الاصل في الكلام المفيد، لأن الفوائد الواقعة بالكلام أجمع لا بد من أن تكون راجعة الى الخبر أو الى معناه. لكنه ربما تتأول الفائدة بصريح لفظه فيكون خبراً، وربما أفاد من جهة المعنى فلا يسمى خبراً، والفائدة لا تختلف، يبين ذلك أن الأمر يحل محل قوله ((أريد منك أن تفعل))، والنهي يحل محل قوله ((أكره أن تفعل)). وإذا استخبر غيره حل محل قوله ((أريد منك أن تفعل)). وإذا دعا ونادى حل محل قوله ((أريد منك أن تصغي الى ما أقول وتتوجه إلي)) الى ما شاكل ذلك

(Text G)

ومع هذا كله فلي فيه نظر إذ يطرد ذلك في جميع الأخبار لأنك إذا قلت: ((زيد أفضل من عمرو))، ولا ريب في كونه خبراً، لم يمكن أن تكذب في التفضيل ويقال لك أنك لم تضلل، بل التكذيب إنما يتعلق بأفضلية زيد، وكذا إذا قلت: ((زيد قائم))، وهو خبر بلا شك، لا يدخله التصديق والتكذيب من حيث الإخبار إذ لا يقال أنك أخبرت أو لم تخبر لأنك أوجدت بهذا اللفظ الاخبار، بل يدخلانه من حيث المقام فيقال أن القيام حاصل أو ليس بحاصل.

(Text H)

“لا يخفى عليك أن التفضيل هنا ليس بمعنى جعلك إياه أفضل بل بمعنى الإخبار عن كونه أفضل، ثم الاخبار الذي هو فعل المتكلم ليس مدلولاً أصلياً للكلام الخبري ولا مقصوداً منه، بل مدلوله الأصلي المقصود منه هو الحكم بالنسبة بين طرفيه وذلك محتمل للصدق والكذب كقولك: ((زيد قائم)) فلا يكون إنشاء أصلاً.

(Text I)

الإنشاء عند أهل العربية يطلق على الكلام الذي ليس لنسبته خارج تطابقه أو لا تطابقه، ويقابله الخبر. وقد يقال على فعل المتكلم، أعني إلقاء الكلام الإنشائي ويقابله الأخبار. والمراد بالإنشاء في قولهم الإنشاء إما طلب أو غيره والطلب إما تمناً أو استفهام أو غيرهما هو المعنى الثاني المصدرى لا الكلام المشتمل عليها.

(Text J)

«(الحزب الثالث)) من محققي المعتزلة: إنه ليس أمراً لصيغته وذاته، ولا لكونه مجرداً عن القرائن مع الصيغة، بل يصير أمراً بثلاث إرادات: إرادة المأمور به، وإرادة إحداهن الصيغة، وإرادة الدلالة بالصيغة على الأمر دون الإباحة والتهديد (5). .. وقال بعضهم تكفي إرادة واحدة وهي إرادة المأمور به. وهذا فاسد من أوجه