



## **The effects of pragmatics in communication and social interaction**

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### **Abstract**

This study investigates pragmatics notion in communication process and social interaction. So it handles some pragmatic elements with enough definitions and examples according to some theories. The main aim of this study is to identify and explain how the elements facilitate to understand the uttered meaning of communication participants. The problem this study probes is the lack of pragmatic knowledge that leads to difficulties and misunderstanding in communication process. The main question the study carried out to answer is to what extent pragmatic competence makes the language understandable to achieve communicative aims. The method the study uses is descriptive method. Results of the study showed that knowledge of pragmatics interprets the uttered meaning and helps participants to achieve their communicative aims.

**Keywords:** pragmatics, pragmatic elements, utterance meaning, speech acts, context

### **1. Introduction**

Communication is a process of transferring message from sender (speaker/writer) and receiver (listener/reader) in an interactive way. Only words and sentences can not reflect the intended meaning (pragmatics). Yule (2010:128) defines pragmatics as "the study of invisible meaning, or how we recognize what is meant even when it isn't actually said or written". There are some factors beyond the words and sentences collaborate together to form the intended meaning and transmit it from sender to receiver. So and for interactive communication, both sender and receiver have to be in the same knowledge and context in order to avoid any communication barriers. If there are any communication barriers, there will be misinterpretation to the sent message. So, the communication will be inefficient to present ideas and opinions.

### **This study aims achieving the following**

1. Identifying pragmatic notion in communication process.
2. Averting misunderstanding in communication process between people as a result of cultural and social differences.
3. Enabling people to construct well-understandable language.
4. Playing with language expressions to make the language understandable, interesting and funny.

### **Questions of the study**

#### **The study tries to answer the following question**

1. Does the absence of pragmatic elements make communication process so difficult and boring?
  1. To what extent pragmatic competence makes the language understandable and achieves the communicative aims.

Concerning the methodology, the study adopts descriptive method with purpose of providing and describing the function of pragmatic elements. In this regard, Seliger and Shohamy (1989:125) cited in Ameer (2013:143) state that "descriptive research may begin with a question or hypothesis; the phenomena it describes are not manipulated

or artificially elicited any way."

### **Literature Review**

Linguists named the intended meaning of speaker or writer as "pragmatics". Yule asserts that speakers or writers must be able to depend on a lot of shared assumptions and expectations (knowledge and context) when they try to communicate. Similarly, Brown and Yule 1983; Thomas 1995 cited in Cutting (2002:2) <sup>[5]</sup> state that there are assumptions shared between sender and receiver of the message to communicate. According to these assumptions, the speaker forms the message and sends it to the hearer. Also the hearer, depending on the same assumptions receives the message and interprets it. Furthermore, Yule (1996:3-4) <sup>[16]</sup> widens the notion of pragmatics and states the four areas that pragmatics concerns with as follows, firstly, "pragmatics is the study of speaker's meaning". This deals with what the speaker intended to mean (regardless of what words and phrases mean" and what the hearer interprets. Secondly, "pragmatics is the study of contextual meaning", this refers to the context and circumstances that the speech is performed. Thirdly, "pragmatics is the study of how more gets communicated than is said", this area concerns with the study of invisible meaning which is not appears on survey. Fourthly, "pragmatics is the study of relative distance", it depends on the listener situation (close or distant) in order to make the speaker decide which must be said and which mustn't.

### **Syntax and Semantics versus Pragmatics**

To present the role of pragmatics in language and to show relationship between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, ibid (1996:4) maintains that syntax refers to the relationship that holds between linguistic forms and their arrangement, and semantics refers to the study of linguistic forms and their meanings in the world, where as the term pragmatics deals with both, linguistic forms and their users. According to these theories, (ibid: 4) argues that pragmatics only includes human in the analysis. Moreover, it concerned with how people make sense.

## Speech Acts Theory

Communication process accompanied with acts and utterances to convey the speaker's intended meaning. A pioneer philosopher of this type of utterances (speech acts), John Austin (1962) defines speech acts as the action performed in saying something. He had valuable lectures published entitled "how to do thing with words". Lyons (1995:240-252) <sup>[9]</sup> criticizes Austin's theories and views on speech act. He argues that the term speech act "should not be interpreted as applying only to the production of spoken utterances". Also, Yule (2010:133) <sup>[3]</sup> sees speech acts as "the action performed by a speaker with utterances ". He explains that when

the speaker says something, he is not just speaking; he seems to be performing the speech acts, as in the example, *'I'll be there at six'*, here the speaker performing the speech act of promising. Furthermore, Yule states that speech act used to describe actions such as *'requesting, commanding, questioning or informing'*. Richards, Platt, and Platt (1992:217) say that Austin classifies the act of the speaker in uttering a sentence into three different types; locutionary act (also known as propositional meaning), illocutionary act, and perlocutionary act. Consequently they view locutionary act as "saying of something which is meaningful and can be understood". Moreover, it is the basic literal meaning of the utterance, for example in the sentence *'shoot the snake'*, if the hearer understands the words *'shoot, the, snake'*, and according to the circumstances can specify the intended snake, therefore, the sentence is locutionary act. Cruse (2006:167) <sup>[6]</sup> views locutionary act as "the production of an utterance, with a particular intended structure, meaning and reference". And in Cutting's opinion (2006: 16), it is the act of saying something. But Yule (1996:48) <sup>[16]</sup> argues that locutionary act theory cannot be performed by the speaker who has tongue problem to form sounds and words to produce a meaningful utterance, for example uttering *'Aha mokofa'* cannot be considered as locutionary act, while *'I have just made some coffee'* can be considered.

The second type is illocutionary act, it is the action that performs by the speaker when saying something. Further, it deals with the speaker's intention about his action such as asserting, expressing, requesting, promising, ordering and apologizing Cutting (2002:16) <sup>[5]</sup>. To explain this idea Cruse (2006: 167) <sup>[6]</sup> provides the example *'I order you leave now'* and mentions that it performed the act of ordering by the utterances of the words. Moreover, taking a similar view, Yule (1996:48) <sup>[16]</sup> states that in illocutionary act the speaker intends specific function in his mind that is known as illocutionary force. Richards, Platt, and Platt (1992:343) assure illocutionary force is "the effect the utterance or written text has on the reader or listener". They prove this view in the example *'I am thirsty'*; the propositional meaning is what the utterance says about the speaker's physical state. So the previous example may be intended as a request for something to drink.

The third type is perlocutionary act, Cutting (2002:16) <sup>[5]</sup> refers it to the effects of words on the hearer when they uttered by the speaker. Cruse (2006) <sup>[6]</sup> supports this view and introduces example *'Pete persuaded Liz to marry him'*, here the important point is that *'Liz'* is affected to act in an appropriate way. Additionally, Yule (1996:48-49) <sup>[16]</sup> indicates that perlocutionary act is generally known as perlocutionary effect. He provides the example *'I have just made some coffee'*, thinking that according to the

circumstances the hearer will understand the effect intended by the speaker (for example to account for nice smell or to get the hearer drink coffee). (ibid:49) believes that any locutionary act bestows an illocutionary force on it. And the illocutionary force carries different analyses of utterance as in the following example:

### a. I'll see you later

b- *I predict that*

c- *I promise you that*

d- *I warn you that*

The different analyses of example (a) represented as a prediction, a promise, or a warning. Here, to not get the hearer confused, and to help him recognize the intended illocutionary force that uttered by speaker, there are two procedures are introduced by Yule (ibid: 49-50) as follows; Illocutionary Force Indicating Device (IFIDs) and felicity conditions.

### Illocutionary Force Indicating Device (IFID)

The IFID is an slotting for a verb that explicitly names the illocutionary act being performed (performative verb (Vp)) as in the example *I (Vp)you that.....*. In the preceding examples *'promise'* and *'warn'* would be the performative verbs. Instead of performing speech act explicitly, speakers sometimes just describe it to the hearer.

### Performative hypothesis

Yule (ibid: 132) defines performative hypothesis as a proposal that, underlying every utterance, there is a clause with a performative verb which makes the illocutionary force explicit. The following example shows the format of the underlying clause:

*I (hereby) vp you that u*

This clause changes the implicit utterances into explicit utterance such as:

Clean up this mess

*I hereby order you that you clean up this mess*

The work was done by Elaine and myself

*I hereby tell you that the work was done by Elaine and myself.* Austin believed that implicit performatives sound more natural and that they do not have a clear explicit performative easy to be recognized by the hearer Cutting (2002:16) <sup>[5]</sup>.

### Felicity conditions

Yule (1996:50) <sup>[16]</sup> states that felicity conditions are the all appropriate circumstances that must be provided in the performance of speech act in order to be understood by the hearer as intended by the speaker. Also Cruse (2006:62) <sup>[6]</sup> describes felicity conditions as "conditions that must be satisfied for a speech act to properly performed". Austin cited in Cutting (2002:18) <sup>[5]</sup> states that felicity conditions are that the context and roles of participants must be accepted and acknowledge by all parties; the action must be carried out completely and the person must have the right intentions.

There is a general condition for all speech acts, that the hearer must hear and understand the language, and that the speaker must not be pretending or play acting. For declarations and directives, the rules are that the speaker must believe that it is possible to carry out the action: they

are performing the act in the hearer's best interests: they are sincere about wanting to do it, and the words count as the act (philosopher Searl) cited in Cutting (ibid: 18). The following conversation between students in a bun lunch explains the need for felicity conditions in their performance:

*Student A: I think I might go and have another bun.*  
*Student B: I was going to have another one.*

*Student C: could you get me a tuna and sweet corn one please?*, this is a directive speech act of 'requesting', here the context and all circumstances are known for participant, therefore, student B does not perform appropriately in asking student A to bring him tuna and sweet corn Cutting (2002:18) [5]. This kind of utterance in the preceding conversation lacks felicity conditions according to Austin's and Searl's models. Yule (1996:50-51) [16] broadens the notion of felicity conditions and classifies it as general conditions, content conditions, preparatory condition, sincerity conditions and essential condition.

On the other hand, Yule (2010:134) [16] states that in direct speech act usually certain syntactic structure works to utter certain function in direct speech act such as in the following table.

	Structure	functions
<i>Did you eat the pizza?</i>	interrogative	question
<i>Eat the pizza (please)</i>	imperative	command (request)
<i>You ate the pizza.</i>	declarative	statement

Further, Searl cited in Cutting (2002:19) [5] maintains that direct speech act is literal meaning that the words conventionally express. By other words, the form agrees with the function explicitly. Thus a declarative form has the function of statement, an interrogative form has the function of a question, an imperative form has the function of request or order. Cutting (ibid: 19) from the previously mentioned example of B's words '*I was going to get another one*', explains that this is an illocutionary force, particularly he said it after A's speech '*I think I might go and have another bun*'. This means that B implying A to get him one. Here, B performs 'request' imperatively as 'Get me one', but using indirect speech act. Yule (2010:134) states that we normally use syntactic structure to utter functions different from that in the previous table to perform pragmatic and underlying meaning. For example '*can you pass the salt*' is an interrogative structure not uttered question, it has a function of request but in indirect speech act.

It's worth notable that Austin, Searl, Cutting and Yule have the same view on the notion of direct speech act and indirect speech act. Cutting (2002:16-17) [5] mentions Searle's (1976) classification of speech acts as follows:

**a- Declarations**

These are words and expressions that change the state of affairs in the world by their utterance, such as '*I bet*', '*I declare*', and '*I resign*'. For example, in the marriage ceremony the priest says '*I hereby pronounce you man and wife*'. Another examples provided by Cruse (2006:169) [6] are '*resign*', '*appoint*', '*sentence*'.

**b- Representatives**

These are acts in which the words state what the speaker

believes to be the case, such as '*describing*', '*claiming*', '*hypothesising*', '*insisting*' and '*predicting*', for example, '*I came, I saw, I conquered*', (*Julius Caesar*). An example for '*assertion*' provided by Richards, Platt, and Platt (1992:343) as '*This is a German car*'. Cruse (1992:168) [6] calls it "Assertives", he states that "these commit the speaker to the truth of what is said: assert, aver, boast, claim, report. Yule (1996:53) [16] mentions that "in using a representative, the speaker makes words fit the world of belief", such as in 'statements of fact, assertions and conclusions', for example:

- *The earth is flat.*
- *Chomsky didn't write about peanuts.*
- *It was a warm sunny day.*

**c- Commissive**

This includes acts in which the words commit the speaker to future action, such as '*promising*', '*offering*', '*threatening*', '*refusing*', '*vowing*' and '*volunteering*', for example, '*I will meet you tomorrow at seven*'.

**d- directives**

This category covers acts in which the words are aimed at making the hearer do something such as '*commanding*', '*requesting*', '*inviting*' and '*forbidding*', For example, '*Please pass me the salt*'

**e- expressives**

This last group includes acts in which the words state what the speaker feels such as '*apologizing*', '*praising*', '*congratulating*', '*deploring*' and '*regretting*', for example, '*Thank you for your services*'. So, Yule (1996:53) [16] states that expressive acts express psychological states such as '*pleasure, sorrow, pain, likes...*' etc as in:

- *I'm really sorry!*
- *Congratulations!*

**Utterance and Utterance Meaning**

Utterance is one of the most important elements of discourse. Richards, Platt, and Platt (1992:395), defines the term utterance as "what is said by any one person before or after another person begins to speak". They provide the following examples:

a. one word utterance: B's reply in:

A: Have you done your homework?  
 B: Yeah.

b. one sentence utterance: A's question and B's answer in:

A: What's the time?  
 B: It's half past five.

Taking similar perspective, Hurford, Heasley, and Smith (2007:16) [7] define utterance as "any stretch of talk, by one person, before and after which there is silence on the part of that person". Regarding utterance meaning, Richards, Platt, and Platt (1992:395) assure that it is "the meaning a speaker conveys by using a particular utterance in a particular context situation". They support their idea with the example '*My watch has stopped again*', could convey, according to context situation the following:

- a. I can tell you the time
- b. This is the reason for my being late.
- . I really have to get it repaired.
- d. What about buying me another one?

Cruse (2006:164) [6] draws a distinction between sentence

meaning and utterance meaning. He argues that "sentence meaning is the meaning a sentence has by virtue of the words it contains and their grammatical arrangement and which is not dependent on context". Whereas, utterance meaning is "the meaning a sentence carries when it is used in a particular context, with referents assigned to all referring expressions, and taking into account any conversational implicatures". Lyons, in this point, criticizes Austin's views in interpreting and using linguistic terms that is far different from his own. He draws a valuable distinction between sentences and utterances.

### Context

Context of speaker's utterance is a part of the universe of discourse. Widdowson (2007:25) <sup>[14]</sup> introduces context as "knowledge of the world that a text is used to refer to, but of the world as it is known by particular groups of the world". In this respect, Hurford, Heasley, and Smith (2007:71) <sup>[7]</sup> explain context as; if two persons talk about the weather on the bus saying that (it is raining, it is warmer than yesterday, etc), also about the bus, for example (it is crowded, slow, old... etc), then any information about the two persons (their sex, nationality, age, color... etc) all these are considered part of the context of utterances in this conversation. But any else topic not related to the conversation is not considered as part of the context. Cruse (2006:35) <sup>[6]</sup> elaborates on the issue of context stating that the most important components of context are the utterance that precedes and follows the intended utterance (co-text), the physical situation, social and power relations, the assumptions of knowledge shared between the speaker and hearer. Further, Yule (2010:129) asserts that co-text is a set of other words used in the same phrase or sentence. A set of other words refers to words that come before and after the intended word. The surrounding words have a great effect in identifying the meaning of particular word. For example the word '*bank*' has many meanings, but if it's used in a sentence with words like steep or overgrown it means for example the river side, but if someone says *I have to go to the bank to withdraw some cash*, here it means the financial institute. Moreover, Widdowson (2007:22) <sup>[14]</sup> explains context in communication as "what happens is that a first-person party (the speaker or writer p1) produces a text which keys the second-person party (the listener or reader, p2) into a context assumed to be shared. Once the context is keyed in, then it can be extended or modified, by means of more text: once a degree of contextual convergence is initiated, it provides the conditions for further convergence".

In a similar view with previous linguists, Cutting (2002:3) <sup>[5]</sup> introduces three types of context: situational context, the speaker's knowledge about what he can see around him, here the situation is the place where the speech is performing or taking place at the moment of speaking. Background knowledge context, what the speaker and the hearer know about each other and the world. Lastly, the co-textual context, what the speaker knows about what he has been saying.

Further, he adds that background knowledge context can be cultural knowledge that people know about areas of life or interpersonal knowledge that concerns the speaker.

### Inference

Yule (2010:131-132) considers inference as "additional information used by the listener to create a connection between what is said and what must be meant". He provides

the following examples:

### Two waiters serving in restaurant

A: *Where's the spinach salad sitting?*

B: *He's sitting by the door.* In the first example the waiter (B) recognizes that the waiter (A) used the word '*salad*' to refer to person who ordered salad, so he answered near the door to refer to the same person. In a nearly similar perspective, Brown and Yule (1983: 256) mention that inference can be defined as what the receiver (reader or listener) interprets from the utterance of literal meaning of a text (written or spoken), the sender's (writer or speaker) intended meaning.

### Example

1. *It's really cold in here with that open window.*
2. *Please close the window.* The utterance in example (1) does not require directly example (2), but in particular circumstances, the receiver of (1) must interpret that the speaker intends from (1) the require of (2).

### Person, Place and Time Deixis

There are some words it is too difficult to interpret their meaning regardless of who uses them, when and where they are used. English language as any other language has some words which have no fixed meaning. Furthermore, these words' meaning vary according to the context of their speaking or writing, who uses them, and when and where. These words known as 'deictic words' and generally known as 'deixis'. Hurford, Heasley, and Smith (2007:66) <sup>[7]</sup> state that "deictic word is one which takes some element of its meaning from the context or situation (i.e. the speaker, the addressee, the time and place) of the utterance in which it is used". Cutting (2006:7) <sup>[5]</sup> classifies deixis into three types: person deixis, the use of personal pronoun such as (I, you, he, she,) to show or point to a person. Secondly, place deixis, the use of demonstratives such as (this, that, here, there) to point to and identify a location in the context. Thirdly, time deixis, it is the expressions used to point to a time such as (now, then, last week). In the example '*you will have to bring it back tomorrow because she isn't here today*', Yule(2010:130) comments that it contains a number of expressions ( you, it, tomorrow, she, here, today ) which needs knowledge of immediate physical context of speaker to understand them. Yule (1996:9-15) <sup>[16]</sup> asserts that deictic expressions known as indexicals, and they cannot be stand alone for their interpretation, they refer to the same context that shared by the speaker and hearer. Moreover, he assures that one of the most basic uses of deictic expression is that face-to-face spoken interaction which can be understood directly by people who are attendants at the utterance time and place, but people who are not attendants may need explanation, for example, '*I'll put this there*'. Therefore, there are problematic and complicated areas in understanding deixis such as telephone answer machine, For example, '*I am not here now*'. Here, '*now*' used to mean any time somebody tries to call me in the future, not at the time of recording this sentence. Also expressions used physically close to mean psychologically distant such as the word '*that*' (for example a perfume that sniffed by the speaker – 'I don't like that'). Lyons (1996:9-15) points to the use of tenses in deixes in the examples *I live here now (present)* and *I lived there then (past)*. Here, the present tense seems proximal form, while the past tense seems distal form. Moreover,

something that happened in the past is used as a way (distal) from the speaker's current situation. And something that is treated as out of the speaker's reach in current situation is also performed as in the past tense form, for example *I could swim (when I was I child), I could be in Hawaii (if I had a lot of money).*

### Presupposition and Entailment

Yule (2010:133) describes presupposition as "what a speaker or writer assumes is true or known by a listener or reader ". He adds that in uttering message, the sender considers many assumptions about what the receiver knows. No doubt that some of these assumptions may be are not true, but mostly they are appropriate. For example: if someone tells you: '*your brother is waiting outside*', this presupposes that you have a brother. Also if you have asked: *Why did you arrive late?* here is a clear presupposition that you did arrive late. Stalnaker (1978: 321) cited in Brown and Yule (1983: 29) <sup>[6]</sup> defines presuppositions as "presuppositions are what is taken by the speaker to be the common ground of the participant in the conversation". Also Cruse(2006:138-139) <sup>[6]</sup> states that "a presupposition is a proposition whose truth is taken for granted by the producer of an utterance and which must be known and taken account of the utterance to make sense to an interpreter". On the other hand, Hurford, Heasley, and Smith (1992:125-126) <sup>[7]</sup> define entailment as "a relationship between two or more sentences (strictly speaking propositions). If knowing that one sentence is true gives us certain knowledge of the truth of the second sentence, then the first sentence entails the second". Also, Cruse (2006:54-55) <sup>[6]</sup> indicates that in entailment there are logical relationship between propositions that convey by sentences when they are about the same topic on the same occasion, for instance, if P is '*Pete killed the wasp*' and Q is '*The wasp died*', here is logical relationship between the two sentences, P entails Q, and if P is true, Q must also be true, and if P is false, Q must be false. Yule (1996:25-29) <sup>[6]</sup> argues that the speakers, not sentences, have presuppositions, and on the contrary, sentences, not speakers, have entailment. Accordingly, he defines entailment as "something that logically follows from what is asserted in the utterance". Consequently, he views entailment as follower to presupposition and the opposite of it, for example *Mary's brother bought three horses*. In uttering this sentence, speaker's presuppositions may be represented in that a person called Mary exists, she has a brother, Mary has only one brother, he has a lot of money, all these presuppositions can be wrong. On the other hand, the sentence entailments are that Mary's brother bought something, bought three animals, bought two horses, bought one horse. These entailments comes from the sentence regardless of speaker's beliefs are right or wrong. Yule (2010:133) states that to check whether the sentence involves presuppositions or not, we negate a sentence with a particular presupposition and see if the presupposition is Remains true. For example,

- Positive: My car is wreck.
- Negative: My car is not wreck

However, the two sentences have different meaning, but they indicate same presupposition that is '*I have a car*'. Presupposition is not the same as entailment, and there are some differences between them. First, if we negate the

entailing sentence, the sentence changes and the entailment remains un true, such as in the example '*Pete killed the beetle*' and '*The beetle died*', the negative version is '*Pete did not kill the beetle*' entails neither '*The beetle died*' nor '*The beetle did not die*'. Second, an entailment cannot be denied without contradiction, for example '*Pete killed the beetle, but it did not die*', while, a presupposition can be denied (although it needs a special intonation) as in '*Pete HASN'T stopped smoking because he never DID smoke*' Cruse (2006:138-139) <sup>[6]</sup>.

### The cooperative principle in conversation

The philosopher Paul Grice described cooperative principle between partners in conversation as follows: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged". Additionally Grice introduced four maxims to support cooperative principle. These maxims as follows:

- a. **The quantity maxim:** To give the needed information only and to avoid redundancy.
- b. **The quality maxim:** To speak truthfully and to give information that you are sure about avoiding false information
- c. **The relation maxim:** To say things that are relevant to the conversation to make it coherent.
- d. **The manner maxim:** The speaker should say things clearly, briefly and orderly so as to make the message comprehensible. To do so, the speaker has to eliminate all expressions that make the speech ambiguous and incomprehensible Yule (2010:147).To show extent to which the above maxims being applied in conversation, we handle the following terms:

### Implicature

The term '*implicature*' is used by Grice (1975) to account for "what a speaker can imply, suggest, or mean as distinct from what the speaker literally says" Broun and Yule (1983:31).

Alan Cruse (2002:85) <sup>[6]</sup> takes the same view stating that implicature is the meaning of utterance which is intended by the speaker but not said explicitly. Broun and Yule (1983:31) indicate that

the philosopher Grice divided implicature into two types; conventional implicatures and conversational implicatures.

#### a. conversational implicature

Cruse (2002:85) <sup>[6]</sup> explains that the utterance meaning in this type of implicature is inferred and contextual information is crucial such as the following example

A: Can I speak to Jane?

B: She's in the shower. B's answer in the above example coherent to A, so it is indirect refuse to A's request at that time. To say that someone is implying something in a conversation, we can consider the following examples

Carol: Are you coming to party tonight?

Lara: I've got an exam tomorrow.

On the face of it, Lara's statement is not an answer to Carol's question, but Carol can interpret it as indirect answer which means 'No'. Interpreting this type of sentence that is literary has

different meaning, request assumption that Lara is being relevant and informative, abiding by the maxims of relation and quantity Yule(2010:148-149). Richards, Platt, and Platt

(1992:85-86) see that since A has made an invitation and there should be an answer either yes or no, B has used the maxim that speakers normally give replies which are relevant to the question that has been asked.

### **b. Conventional implicature**

Yule (1996:45) argues that conventional implicatures unlike conversational implicatures, do not require conversation to occur, need no specific context to be interpreted and do not depend on cooperative interaction or maxims. They associate with specific words to give the intended meaning. Those words such as the conjunction *but*, *even*, *yet*, *and* in the following examples

- *Marry suggested black, but I chose white.* Here the conjunction 'but' used as an implicature of contrast.
- *Even John came to the party.* 'Even' in the above example is conventional implicature of contrary to expectation.
- *Yesterday, Marry was happy and ready to work.* The implicature of 'and' is 'in addition'.
- *She put on her clothes and left the house.* The use of 'and' in this example is different from the use in the above example. Here 'and' is used as implicature of sequence.

Conventional implicature is associated with particular linguistic expressions to give the intended meaning, as in *Haven't you finished yet?* The meaning of utterance in this sentence implies that the speaker is surprised. Cruse (2002:85) <sup>[6]</sup>

### **Conclusion**

This study has been adopted aiming to interpret pragmatic notion so as to understand the exact uttered meaning of communication participants. So it handled the elements of pragmatics in diverse contexts. The elements have been defined and supported by examples, explanations, and linguists' theories and opinions. The analysis taken in earlier section showed the importance of knowledge of pragmatics in communication and social interaction. It explains that to what extent knowledge of pragmatics makes the language understandable and helps participants to achieve their communicative aims. Based on this result, the researcher recommends that pragmatics should be taught in schools.

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